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foreword
For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defence Policy has been one of the crucial 
topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the 
Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable. 
The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has 
deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start 
of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and 
military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its 
comprehensive approach to crisis management. 
Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and fol-
lowing its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a 
special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civil-
ian and military participation. 
The European Security and Defence College is providing such training at the strategic level with 
a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the imple-
mentation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.
This Handbook on CSDP, made available under the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus pro-
vides a sound documentation for trainers and trainees of the European Security and Defence Col-
lege and beyond. It is my hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive under-
standing of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
Catherine Ashton
High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
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foreword
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU set itself new levels of ambition. New struc-
tures and procedures will make it easier for the Union to be more active and to be more coher-
ent. The newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, will also facilitate 
European external action.
 
The new structures will also give rise to a need to familiarise and train more personnel to enable 
them to work more efficiently in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy. In my 
post as Minister of Defence and Sports, I know from personal experience that training and edu-
cation is of the utmost importance, sometimes even a sine qua non, for accomplishing missions 
successfully. Therefore Austria supported from the beginning the development of the European 
Security and Defence College in addition to other efforts aimed at enhancing the operability of 
CFSP/CSDP.
I would like to thank the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College for the work 
done so far. I firmly believe that this present handbook will support the Common Security and 
Defence Policy and the relevant training and will contribute to the further development a common 
and shared European security culture.
Norbert Darabos
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports
of the Republic of Austria
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PrefaCe of THe ediTorS
The first ever training course on ESDP given 
at EU level was provided in 2003 under the 
Greek Presidency and its Presidency initiative 
for a “Common Training”, the “Pilot ESDP Ori-
entation Course”, as it is called. This pioneer-
ing course was conducted in the basement of a 
Commission building in Brussels and provided 
the basis for further work.
An evolving European Security and Defence 
Policy and the recognised need for training and 
education in this field led to the establishment 
of the European Security and Defence College 
(ESDC) in 2005 tasked to promote a common 
European security culture. Since that time, 
thousands of civilian and military personnel 
within and outside the European Union have 
attended ESDP and ESDP-related courses pro-
vided by national training institutions, most of 
them under the umbrella of the ESDC.
The European Security and Defence College 
developed into a key player in ESDP training. 
Since 2003, the number and variety of course 
offers have been extended in line with the 
ESDP development. In addition to the Orien-
tation Course, a High-Level Course was intro-
duced aimed at personnel working in key posi-
tions in the field of ESDP in the capitals and EU 
institutions. A “Press and Public Information” 
(PPI) Course was introduced by Austria in close 
cooperation with the Council Press Service in 
2006. Between 2007 and 2009, several other 
courses were established, including courses 
on “Capability Development”, “ESDP and 
Gender”, “Africa and ESDP”, “Security Sector 
Reform”, “Mission Planning” and “Decision 
Making Seminars”. Additionally, and in sup-
port of the various courses, an Internet-based 
Distance Learning (IDL) System was set up, 
strongly supported by Belgium and Romania.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
ESDP changed to CSDP. Training will continue 
to play an important role in its further devel-
opment. However, the lack of proper training 
material on CSDP has been raised as a major 
concern by trainers and by course participants 
who wished to have general documentation on 
CSDP to which they could refer .
The development of CSDP-related training 
material is a specific task given to the ESDC but 
due to the lack of resources, it has not yet been 
possible to implement it. Austria, a strong sup-
porter of the European Security and Defence 
College, volunteered to draw up the present 
“CSDP Handbook” in close cooperation with 
the ESDC Secretariat 
We, the editors, did not want to duplicate 
efforts which were already made , for example 
in the form of the “Guide to the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP)” developed by 
the French delegation in Brussels. Nor is this 
handbook intended to duplicate the academic 
work of the EU Institute for Security Studies in 
Paris or the publications of the Council Press 
Service. All these publications have been of 
particular help in the development of CSDP 
and related training.
The main aim of this handbook is twofold: 
firstly, it will serve as a reference book for the 
course participants after they have attended 
courses at the ESDC; secondly, it serves as a 
first guide for trainers at national institutes in 
their preparations for CSDP-related courses.
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Without their help, assistance and contribu-
tions, this book would not have been possi-
ble. We know the difficulties and challenges in 
times of change and therefore we very much 
appreciated any support that was given . 
We would also like to thank the Austrian Min-
istry of Defence and Sports, in particular the 
Security Policy Director Major-General Johann 
Pucher, who supported this project from the 
beginning. And, last but not least, many thanks 
to Dirk Dubois and Dan Trifanescu from the 
ESDC Secretariat, who helped to make this 
book possible.
 
Vienna/Brussels, in April 2010
In line with this, the table of contents of this 
book largely reflects the CSDP Standard Cur-
riculum for a CSDP Orientation Course, supple-
mented with elements of other types of train-
ing activity under the umbrella of the ESDC.
Thanks to all colleagues in the EU who 
assisted, directly or indirectly, with the compi-
lation of this book. In particular, we would like 
to thank Ernst Schmid (Austrian Military Rep-
resentation, Brussels), Sven Biscop (Egmont 
Institute, Brussels), Gustav Lindstrom (Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy, Geneva), Johann 
Frank (Austrian Ministry of Defence and 
Sports, Vienna), Silviu Costache (EU Military 
Staff, Brussels), Nicolas Kerleroux and Céline 
Ruiz (both Council Press Service, Brussels). 
Dr. Jochen Rehrl is the Austrian representa-
tive in the Steering Committee of the European 
Security and Defence College and Head of Unit 
for Defence Policy in the Directorate for Secu-
rity Policy in the federal Ministry of Defence 
and Sports of the Republic of Austria.
Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, member of the Pol-
icy Unit of the HR, is acting Head of the ESDC 
Secretariat currently located in the Crisis Man-
agement and Planning Directorate in the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union.
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1THe develoPmenT of CfSP and CSdP
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1.1 euroPean inTegraTion:  
PoST world war ii To CSdP
The origins of the security and defence 
architecture of Europe can be found in the 
post-World War II situation. Starting in the late 
1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for 
increased cooperation across Europe. Exam-
ples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty 
(1948) – sowing the seeds for a Western Euro-
pean Union – and the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community 1951 which placed 
strategic resources under a supranational 
authority. 
In the late 1960s, the European Community 
(EC) began to explore ways in which to harmo-
nise members’ foreign policies. At the Hague 
Summit held in December 1969, European 
leaders instructed their respective foreign min-
isters to examine the feasibility of closer inte-
gration in the political domain. In response, for-
eign ministers introduced the idea of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in the Davignon 
Report from October 1970. The report defined 
its objectives (harmonization of positions, 
consultation and, when appropriate, common 
actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meet-
ings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly 
meetings of the Political Directors forming the 
Political Committee). Overall, EPC aimed to 
facilitate the consultation process among EC 
Member States. 
European Political Cooperation served as 
the foundation for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 Novem-
ber 1993, it created a single institutional frame-
work (the European Union) based on three pil-
lars – the second of which was labelled Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP is more 
far-reaching than European Political Coopera-
tion. For example, it breaks new ground via 
its Article J.4 which states CFSP includes “all 
questions related to the security of the Union, 
including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence.”
While the European Union identified ambi-
tious objectives in the area of external security 
and defence through the Maastricht Treaty, it 
would not be until the late 1990s, in the after-
math of the wars of secession in the Balkans, 
that concrete provisions were introduced to 
endow the EU with tangible crisis manage-
ment capabilities. Following the St. Malo Dec-
laration in 1998, numerous European Council 
summit meetings defined the military and civil-
ian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg 
tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking). 
Examples include the Cologne European Coun-
cil Meeting (1999) which laid the foundations 
for European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), the Helsinki European Council Meet-
ing (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal 
2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European 
Council Meeting (2000) which identified four 
civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP became 
operational through the initiation of the first 
ESDP missions. Since 2003, the EU has initi-
ated over twenty crisis management opera-
tions. In addition, the EU presented its first 
ever European Security Strategy in December 
2003, outlining key threats and challenges fac-
ing Europe.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009, ESDP was renamed Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 
HANDBOOK CSDP  13 
addition, the Lisbon Treaty established the post 
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The post merges 
the two positions of High Representative for 
CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999-
2009) and of Commissioner for External Rela-
tions (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 
2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disap-
pearance of the pillar structure. 
The Lisbon Treaty formally endorses the 
extension of the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, 
that now include ‘joint disarmament opera-
tions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict preven-
tion and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-
making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (art.28B/
Article 43 (1) TEU). These tasks may contribute 
to the fight against terrorism, including by 
‘supporting third states in combating terrorism 
in their territories’. Finally, political and mili-
tary solidarity among EU Member States is in 
the Treaty via the inclusion of a mutual assist-
ance clause (art.28A7/Article 42 (7) TEU), and 
a ‘solidarity clause’ (Title VII, art.188R1/Article 
222 TFEU).
year event
1951 Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
1954
Failure of the European Defence Community 
Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU
1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome 
1969 The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation
1992 Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force 1993)
1997 Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)
1998 Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (St. Malo)
1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP
2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council
2003
Adoption of the European Security Strategy 
Adoption of the Berlin-Plus Arrangements 
2004 Headline Goal 2010/Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (updated in 2007 to CHG 2010)
2009 Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – ESDP becomes CSDP
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2.1 baCkground and 
develoPmenT of THe eSS in 2003 
STraTegiC diviSionS
When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the 
wake of the 1998 Franco-British meeting in St-
Malo, there was strong agreement on the need 
to tackle the military means, but there con-
sensus ended. Member States differed widely 
on the political-strategic dimension, a debate 
which goes far beyond CSDP, beyond the CFSP 
even, but which concerns the whole of EU 
external action, across the pillars. What should 
be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security 
policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy 
should the EU have? And what then should 
be the precise role of the military instrument 
in EU external action? In order not to lose the 
momentum, it was decided to push through 
with those elements on which an agreement 
existed, i.e. the means and institutions of CSDP, 
assuming that once these were in place the 
strategic debate would inevitably have to fol-
low. Accordingly, following the December 1999 
European Council in Helsinki, where the ‘Head-
line Goal’ was defined, the EU started building 
military and civilian capabilities for crisis man-
agement, without possessing an overall strate-
gic framework for its external action. 
That is not to say that EU external action 
has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, 
a distinctive European approach to security 
has emerged, which can be characterised as 
integrated, multidimensional or comprehen-
sive. Yet the implicit assumptions on which 
it was based needed to be substantiated and 
policy areas needed to be integrated in order 
to arrive at a framework for maximally consist-
ent, coherent and effective external action. For 
when the EU is confronted with acute crises, 
such as the one in Iraq in 2003, these implicit 
assumptions have proved to be insufficient to 
arrive at a common policy. More often than 
not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on 
how to respond to such crises, even when the 
instruments and means to do so were at hand. 
A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid 
internal divides and ensure the EU’s participa-
tion in international decision-making. 
2003: a favourable ConTeXT
It seems as if the intra-European crisis over 
Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a 
breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the 
Member States supporting the invasion wanted 
to demonstrate that the EU does care about the 
security threats perceived by the US and that 
the transatlantic alliance is viable still. Hence the 
similarity between the threat assessment in the 
ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy 
(NSS), which must be seen as a political mes-
sage to Washington, and the strong empha-
sis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On 
the other hand, the Member States opposing 
the invasion were equally eager to show that 
even though the threat assessment is to a large 
degree shared with the US – if not perhaps the 
perception of the intensity of the threat – there 
are other options available to deal with these 
threats. The context of mid-2003 partially also 
favoured the adoption of the ESS: the success-
ful conclusion of the European Convention and 
the grand and – then still – promising undertak-
ing to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created 
a climate in which the preparation of a strategy 
seemed more feasible than before. The sum-
mer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military 
operation without the use of NATO assets and 
outside Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC 
(12 June – 1 September). 
HANDBOOK CSDP  17 
THe drafTing ProCeSS
At the informal meeting of the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council in Greece on 
2 and 3 May 2003, High Representative Javier 
Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked 
with producing a draft strategic document. At 
its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the 
European Council welcomed the document 
submitted by Solana, A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World, and charged him with taking the work 
forward with a view to completing a strategy by 
its next meeting. The EU then organised three 
seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 
October) and Stockholm (20 October), bringing 
together officials from the Member States, the 
future Member States and the European insti-
tutions, as well as experts from the academic 
world, NGOs and the media. This innovative 
process allowed the High Representative to col-
lect comments and suggestions from a wide 
variety of actors and observers, a number of 
which found their way into the final European 
Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by 
the European Council meeting on 12 Decem-
ber 2003. At the same time, drafting by a select 
group of high-level collaborators of Solana, 
rather than by committee and involving Mem-
ber States’ delegations, ensured a concise and 
very readable document. 
The main reason why these partly contra-
dictory motivations led to results is that the 
EU was able to build on an extensive foreign 
policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices 
contained in the ESS were already evident as 
emerging strategic orientations in actual EU 
policies. Rather than adopting a fundamen-
tally new orientation, to a large extent there-
fore the ESS must be seen as the codification 
of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other 
words, although the context of the Iraq crisis 
would suggest a deep division between Mem-
ber States, the ESS actually builds on a strong 
consensus on the basic orientations of EU for-
eign policy. Indeed, the real intra-European 
divide over Iraq did not concern the substance 
and principles of policy. Based on an assess-
ment of past policies, it can safely be argued 
e.g. that all Member States agree that in prin-
ciple the use of force is an instrument of last 
resort which requires a Security Council man-
date. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still 
the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If 
the US reverts to the use of force in a situation 
in which the EU in principle would not do so, or 
not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steer-
ing an autonomous course, based on its own 
principles, or supporting its most important 
ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on 
a number of foreign policy issues the EU had 
already unanimously taken positions contrary 
to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto 
Protocol and on various trade issues. 
Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only 
build on consensus in areas where it existed. 
On a number of issues it remains particularly 
vague because consensus was absent or not 
yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned 
in the ESS, because not to do so would have 
invoked strong criticism, but no more than 
that: no real choices are made particularly 
on the nature of the transatlantic partnership 
and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an 
international actor. This divide remains a fun-
damental obstacle to a fully cohesive and reso-
lute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain 
a number of clear choices and thus has cer-
tainly strengthened the strategic framework 
for EU foreign policy. 
GS/HR Solana, the father of the ESS, with 
his successor, HR/VP Ashton
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2.2 main THemeS of THe eSS and 
key meSSage for CSdP 
PrinCiPleS of eu foreign PoliCy 
From the ESS three main principles can be 
deduced on which all EU external action is 
based. 
The first is prevention: “This implies that we 
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. 
Conflict prevention and threat prevention can-
not start too early”. A permanent strategy of 
prevention and stabilisation, addressing the 
root causes of threats and challenges, aims 
to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion 
and the use of force will not be necessary. 
Addressing the root causes means to close 
the gap, both within and between countries, 
between the haves and the have-nots in terms 
of access to the core public goods to which 
the EU feels everybody is entitled: security, 
economic prosperity, political freedom and 
social well-being. For this gap generates feel-
ings of frustration and marginalisation on the 
part of those who are excluded economically 
or politically, radicalisation and extremism of 
various kinds, social and economic instability, 
massive migration flows, and tension and con-
flicts within and between States. Effective pre-
vention is an enormous challenge, for it means 
addressing a much wider range of issues, at a 
much earlier stage, across the globe, because 
as the ESS says “the first line of defence will 
often be abroad”. 
Closing the gap between haves and have-
nots of necessity demands a holistic approach, 
the second principle, for the range of public 
goods is comprehensive as such. The secu-
rity, economic, political and social dimensions 
are inextricably related – an individual cannot 
enjoy any one core public good unless he has 
access to them all – and all are present, in dif-
fering degrees, in all threats and challenges. 
In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely 
military, nor can any be tackled by purely mili-
tary means. Each requires a mixture of instru-
ments”. Therefore every foreign policy must 
simultaneously address all dimensions, making 
use in an integrated way of all available instru-
ments: “Diplomatic efforts, development, trade 
and environmental policies, should follow the 
same agenda”. This is perhaps the core phrase 
in the ESS: “The best protection for our security 
is a world of well-governed democratic states. 
Spreading good governance, supporting social 
and political reform, dealing with corruption 
and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law 
and protecting human rights are the best means 
of strengthening the international order”. 
Such a holistic approach is best imple-
mented via multilateralism, the third princi-
ple: “We need to pursue our objectives both 
through multilateral cooperation in interna-
tional organisations and through partnerships 
with key actors”. Only in cooperation with oth-
ers can our objectives be achieved peacefully, 
only in cooperation with all global actors can 
global challenges be successfully addressed, 
and only in cooperation with a wide range of 
actors can complex issues be comprehensively 
tackled. “The development of a stronger inter-
national society, well functioning international 
institutions and a rule-based international 
order is our objective”, declares the ESS under 
the heading of “effective multilateralism”. Mul-
tilateralism is “effective” to the extent that the 
ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institu-
tions manages to provide access to the core 
public goods to citizens worldwide. 
HANDBOOK CSDP  19 
imPliCaTionS for CSdP 
The ESS constitutes an important strategic 
choice, but it mostly tells us how to do things – 
it is much vaguer on what to do, it is incomplete 
in terms of objectives. Of course, a strategy 
must be translated into sub-strategies and poli-
cies for it to be put into action. With regard to 
CSDP however, such a “sub-strategy” is miss-
ing, hence there is a missing link between the 
ambition in the ESS – “to share in the respon-
sibility for global security” – and the practice of 
CSDP operations and capability development. 
As the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy – Providing Security 
in a Changing World states, “We need to priori-
tise our commitments, in line with resources”. 
Three dimensions must be covered. 
First of all, there is not even consensus about 
which tasks or types of operations the EU can 
undertake. Legally, the EU’s Petersberg tasks 
include operations at the high end of the violence 
spectrum, including combat operations, yet 
politically the Member States are still extremely 
divided over the use of force under the EU flag. 
Secondly, priority regions and scenarios 
must be defined in relation to Europe’s vital 
interests: where and why should the EU deploy 
troops and perhaps even go to war? Because 
of its proximity, “the neighbourhood” logically 
appears as a clear priority where the EU should 
not only be active, but take the lead. It could be 
debated whether the “broader neighbourhood”, 
including Central Asia and the Gulf, is a prior-
ity as well. Next to the neighbourhood, the ESS 
singles out Iran as a priority. Other conflicts are 
mentioned in the ESS – Kashmir, the Great Lakes 
Region, the Korean Peninsula – but whether the 
EU should actively contribute to their resolution 
is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
an important area of focus for CSDP, though the 
strategy behind it has not always been clear. 
For example, given that the EU twice intervened 
in the DRC at the request of the UN, in 2003 
and 2006, why was the third request, in 2008, 
refused? This demonstrates that without a strat-
egy, it is impossible to define what the success 
of an operation means. A perfect example of a 
European priority is the operation against piracy 
off the coast of Somalia, securing Europe’s lines 
of communication with the world. Importantly, 
the collective security system of the UN, and 
therefore of the EU as its main supporter and 
with two permanent members on the Security 
Council among its ranks, can only be legitimate 
if it addresses the threats to everyone’s security 
– too much selectivity undermines the system. 
The EU must therefore also shoulder its share 
of the responsibility by playing an active role in 
the Security Council and by contributing capa-
bilities to UN(-mandated) crisis management 
and peacekeeping operations. 
Finally, the EU must decide what scale of 
effort to devote to these priorities. CSDP is 
based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 
60,000 troops, but this has been overshadowed 
by the much more limited battle groups. The 
availability of the forces declared cannot be 
assessed, because Member States declare num-
bers that in theory they are willing to deploy for 
CSDP operation, but no pre-identified units, and 
have often declared similar numbers to NATO 
as well. If all ongoing CSDP, NATO, UN and 
national operations in which EU Member States 
participate are counted, Europe deploys more 
than 80,000 troops, but they obviously cannot 
mobilise 60,000 additional troops for expedi-
tionary operations. The combined armed forces 
of the EU-27 total 2 million troops. There is no 
vision about how many of those troops Europe 
really needs. 
These questions should be answered in a 
military or civil-military sub-strategy, or “white 
book,” specifically for CSDP. As Member States 
have but a single set of forces, the question is 
not what the CSDP level of ambition is and what 
is that of NATO; the question is what the EU, as 
the political expression of Europe and as a com-
prehensive foreign policy actor, wants to con-
tribute as a global security provider, regardless 
of whether a specific operation is undertaken 
under CSDP or NATO (or UN) command.
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European Security Strategy: An emerging 
system of concepts and sub-strategies
Strategy defined as the art and science of develop-
ing, applying and coordinating all necessary instru-
ments to deal with the relevant security challenges 
must be based on a system of grand strategy and 
complementing sub-strategies. Although the actual 
system of “security strategies” of the European 
Union is not equally precise on all aspects and does 
not comprise all necessary sub-strategies 1 in a coor-
dinated manner a comprehensive system of con-
cepts, doctrines, policies and strategies is emerging.
The European Security Strategy is the corner-stone 
document of strategic thinking and planning within 
the EU. But the ESS in which the European Union 
clarifies its security strategy which is aimed at achiev-
ing a secure Europe in a better world, identifying 
the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic 
objectives and setting out the political implications 
for Europe, is written on a rather abstract level. The 
“Grand Strategic Chapeau” of the ESS must therefore 
be complemented by more specific sub-strategies.
The process of complementing the ESS is not a 
strategic “top-down” project but more an evolving 
endeavour. Nevertheless it is possible to bring the 
documents and “sub-strategies” in a logical and sys-
tematic order (see diagram 1, next page).
The EU s´ sub-strategies include amongst others:
regional and country specific strategies and poli-•	
cies with a special focus on the European Neigh-
bourhood, the Western Balkans and Africa
horizontal strategies dealing with proliferation, •	
the nexus of security and development, security 
implications of climate change or cyber security
2.3 eXCurSion:
eSS: an emerging SySTem of 
ConCePTS and Sub-STraTegieS – 
an aCademiC view
strategies and programmes for safeguarding •	
internal security including the “solidarity clause” 
which offers the option of using even military 
assets for internal purposes 
counter-terrorism and combating radicalization •	
and recruitment strategies
CSDP concepts and processes like the civilian •	
and military headline goal, the Battlegroup con-
cept or the capability development plan.
Most of the above-mentioned documents do not 
directly deal with external countries but are aimed 
at coordinating internal policies between the EU 
Member States. 
Linkage of internal and external security  
policies
The main responsibility for internal security rests 
with the Member States. But with the “Solidarity 
clause” the EU has a complementary role in dealing 
with natural and technical disasters and terrorism.
Internal and external security policies are inter-
linked: an adequate “homeland security system” 
within the EU and within the Member States is a pre-
condition for an active external security policy. And, 
vice versa, against the background of a globalised 
security landscape, the internal security of the EU can 
only be safeguarded through a preventive and com-
prehensive foreign and security policy which deals 
effectively with external risks. The predominately 
transnational character of postmodern risks requires a 
more systematic linking of internal and external secu-
rity and an effect based employment of the necessary 
security instruments (see diagram 2, next page). 
1 “Sub-strategy” is not an official term for a specific category of documents, but refers to those documents that deal with 
certain security domains or elaborate on one aspect of the ESS. 
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• Solidarity Clause
• The Hague Programme (10 priorities e.g.: 
fight against terrorism, migration manage-
ment, borders and visas, privacy and 
information security,  organised crime)
• Strategy on the External Dimension of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Issues: human rights, fight against 
terrorism, OC, migration, good governance)
• European Border Control Agency
• European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection
• Counter Terrorism Strategy
• EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism
• EU Terror Financing Prevention Guidelines
• Conceptual Framework on the ESDP-
Dimension of the fight against terrorism
• European Strategy for Combating Radica-
lisation and Recruitment to Terrorism
• Non-Proliferation Strategy
• Security and Development
• Small Arms and Light Weapons
• Security Sector Reform
• Climate Change and security
• Cyber Security
• European Neighborhood Policy
• Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
• Various Balkan Strategies and Policies
• EU Africa Strategy
• Central Asia Strategy
• Country specific strategies and policies
Grafik: Sandawi 
/Frank 2010
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Culture of coordination
The core policy challenge for the EU institutions 
and the Member States is the effective coordination 
of policies and instruments within a sound con-
cept of civil military coordination (CMCO). Most 
of the tools which are necessary to deal with the 
new security challenges – which require by nature 
a comprehensive approach – are available within 
the European Union. But they belong to different 
levels (Commission, Council Secretariat or Member 
States). 
None of the objectives of the ESS can be achieved 
without a coordinated approach and the contribu-
tion of all relevant sectors of the EU. CSDP does 
not only have an external crisis management func-
tion but might be a helpful toolbox, capability and 
knowledge provider for other security domains as 
well. 
Drafting of a “White Book on Defence”
Diagram 1 demonstrates that at least one central 
sub-strategy is missing so far: a clear cut military 
strategy. The development of a military strategy has 
been assessed as premature so far. But in the after-
math of the Implementation Report (2008) a care-
ful assessment of the available sub-strategies would 
be a helpful element in institutionalizing the strate-
gic debate within the EU. Such a process would also 
make it possible to identify in which areas the ESS 
has not yet been translated into “sub-strategies” or 
policies. 
One element in this discussion process might be 
the drafting of a “White Book on Defence” which 
could comprise:
a common analysis of the strategic situation, risks •	
and challenges
a definition of the military level of ambition of •	
the EU derived from common defined European 
security interests
strategic guidelines for cooperation with partners •	
a definition of the possible role of the military in •	
implementing the solidarity clause
guidance for the harmonisation of national force •	
planning and capability development includ-
ing the “permanent structured cooperation” and 
“pooling and sharing” models
guidance concerning the military implications of •	
the “comprehensive approach”
defining the dimension of the military in dealing •	
with non-military threats and in implementing 
non-military sub-strategies
cooperation with third countries and partners.•	
Overlapping Security Tasks
CSDP
Justice and Home 
Affairs
Crisis Management
Civilian and Military Missions and Operations
Critical Infrastructure Protection
European Programme for CIP
EU CIP-Warning Information Network
Prev., Prep. and Conseq. Management of Terrorism
Counter Terrorism
Counter Terrorism Strategy; Solidarity Clause
EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism
Framework Document on ESDP/Terrorism
Ext. Dimension of Domestic Security
Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice (i.g. human rights,
fight against terrorism, organized crime,)
Domestic Security
The Hague Programme (i.g. Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice Migration, Asylum)
Capability Development
Civilian Headline Goal 
Headline Goal 
Humanitarian Capabilities of the Commission
Civil Protection
Community Civil Protection Mechanism
(i.g. MIC, Common Emergency-CIS)
Border Control
European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
of the Member States of the European Union 
Commission
Security
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Elements of the
comprehensive security
domains within the EU
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3 CfSP/CSdP-relaTed aSPeCTS of THe 
liSbon TreaTy
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3.1 novelTieS of CfSP/CSdP 
of the Council and from the Diplomatic Serv-
ices of EU Member States.
THe foreign affairS CounCil (faC)
The Foreign Affairs Council formulates pol-
icy regarding the Union's external action on the 
basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the 
European Council and ensures that the Union's 
action is consistent. The High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, 
contributes through her proposals towards the 
preparation of the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy and ensures implementation of the 
decisions adopted by the European Council 
and the Council.
The General Affairs Council (GAC) and the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) are the only 
The Lisbon Treaty can be described as a 
milestone in the development of the “Common 
Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and spe-
cifically of the “Common Security and Defence 
Policy” (CSDP). In addition to the dual function 
of the High Representative for CSFP, who is 
at the same time Vice- President of the Com-
mission, the main CFSP/CSDP-related aspects 
include:
THe euroPean eXTernal 
aCTion ServiCe (eeaS)
The impact of EU foreign policy will be 
enhanced by the creation of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which will 
work for the High Representative. EEAS staff 
will come from the relevant departments of the 
European Commission & General Secretariat 
Ceremony of the Signature of the Treaty of Lisbon: Lisbon, 13 December 2007
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Council formations which are laid down in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, there is only one 
Council of the European Union, which can meet 
in 10 different formations. The Council forma-
tions can be extended or limited in numbers by 
the Heads of State and Government.
THe CSdP TaSk CaTalogue
The CSDP task catalogue includes the 
Petersberg tasks , namely humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis-
management tasks of combat forces , including 
peacemaking. And additionally to the Peters-
berg tasks , the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the 
joint disarmament operations, military advice 
and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peace-keeping as well as post-conflict stabili-
sation tasks. All these tasks should contribute 
to the fight against terrorism, including by sup-
porting third countries in combating terrorism 
in their territories.
THe muTual aSSiSTanCe ClauSe
The mutual assistance clause follows the 
EU principle of solidarity. It guarantees the 
EU Member States aid and assistance from all 
other partners in the event of armed aggres-
sion on the territory of a Member State. The 
assistance is not limited to civilian, military or 
diplomatic efforts, but must be read as mean-
ing as comprehensive as is necessary (“by all 
the means in their power”). Nevertheless, the 
status of neutrals and of non-allied and NATO 
partners will be respected.
PermanenT STruCTured 
CooPeraTion
Permanent Structured Cooperation should 
help Member States to build up closer links 
among each other. The preconditions for 
joining such a Permanent Structured Coop-
eration are firstly the fulfilment of higher cri-
teria for military capabilities and secondly the 
more binding commitments to one another in 
this area with a view to undertaking the most 
demanding missions. In Protocol No 10 to 
this Treaty, some more application criteria are 
given:
An EU Member State must
(a) proceed more intensively to develop its 
defence capabilities through the development 
of its national contributions and participation, 
where appropriate, in multinational forces, in 
the main European equipment programmes, 
and in the activity of the Agency in the field of 
defence capabilities development, research, 
acquisition and armaments (European Defence 
Agency), and
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the 
latest, either at national level or as a compo-
nent of multinational force groups, targeted 
combat units for the missions planned, struc-
tured at a tactical level as a battle group, with 
support elements including transport and 
logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks 
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Aceh Monitoring Mission: 3rd Phase of Decom-
missioning – Meulaboh, 15 November 2005
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referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, within a period of five to 30 days, 
in particular in response to requests from the 
United Nations Organisation, and which can 
be sustained for an initial period of 30 days 
and be extended to at least 120 days.
TaSking of a grouP of 
member STaTeS
The Council may entrust the execution of a 
task, within the Union framework, to a group 
of Member States, which are willing and have 
the necessary capability for such a task, in 
order to protect the Union's values and serve 
its interests. Those Member States, in associa-
tion with the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agree 
among themselves on the management of the 
task. Nevertheless, Member States participat-
ing in the task will keep the Council regularly 
informed of its progress on their own ini-
tiative or at the request of another Member 
State. They will inform the Council immedi-
ately should the completion of the task entail 
major consequences or require amendment 
of the objective, scope and conditions set for 
the task. The Council will then decide if further 
steps are necessary.
finanCing
The principles of financing CSFP/CSDP mis-
sions remains unchanged. The administrative 
expenditure of the institutions arising from the 
implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian 
missions and military operations, is charged to 
the budget of the European Union. The same 
applies, as a general rule, to operating expendi-
ture except for cases where the Council – acting 
unanimously – decides otherwise and for such 
expenditure arising from operations having mil-
itary or defence implications. If expenditure is 
not charged to the Union budget, it will be gen-
erally charged to the Member States in accord-
ance with their gross national product (unless 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Polish Patrol, March 2009
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the Council unanimously decides otherwise).
The new aspect, which was introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, is the creation of a so-
called start-up fund. Preparatory activities for 
the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Arti-
cle 43 TEU which are not charged to the Union 
budget will be financed by a start-up fund 
made up of Member States' contributions. The 
Council will then authorise the High Represent-
ative to use the fund. The High Representative 
reports to the Council on the implementation 
of this remit.
SolidariTy ClauSe  
(noT direCTly CSdP relaTed)
The Solidarity Clause is not part of the CSDP 
chapter of the Treaty on European Union, but 
is laid down in Art. 222 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Although 
there is no direct link with the CFSP/CSDP, the 
same capabilities are addressed and it is there-
fore worth mentioning .
This clause relates to the prevention of ter-
rorist threats, the protection from any terrorist 
attack and consequence management if such 
an attack occurs. Additionally, the solidarity 
clause deals with events such as man-made or 
natural disasters. In all these above mentioned 
cases, the Union and its Member States will act 
jointly in a spirit of solidarity. The Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, 
including the military resources made avail-
able by the Member States.
EUPOL Afghanistan: Police training, 18 June 2007
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3.2 eXCurSion:
PermanenT STruCTured 
CooPeraTion – an aCademiC view
The Lisbon Treaty’s Main CSDP-related aspect: 
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
The Objective: More Deployed, More Quickly 
The Protocol on Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion on defence (PSCD) (Art. 1) sets out two objec-
tives, one of which, i.e. to supply or contribute to 
a battle group, has already been achieved by most 
Member States. This leaves a single major objec-
tive: to proceed more intensively to develop defence 
capacities, which must of course be available and 
deployable, as Art. 2 (c) says. The main problem 
of Europe’s armed forces is fragmentation: limited 
defence budgets spent on a plethora of small-scale 
capabilities result in disproportionately high spend-
ing on “overheads” (and useless intra-European 
duplications) and, consequently, less spending on 
deployable capabilities and actual operations. To 
overcome this low cost-effectiveness, multinational 
cooperation is a must. Hence PSCD must be inclu-
sive: the more pMS, the more synergies and effects 
of scale can be created. Thus, the challenge is to rec-
oncile inclusiveness and ambition, i.e. to translate 
the Protocol into quantitative criteria that allow all 
MS to participate but that do entail a real commit-
ment. 
Criteria for Participation: Realistic but Real 
Criteria for participation must be realistic, i.e. 
they must be within reach of the majority of MS, 
and must stimulate pMS to tackle the obstacles to 
deployability and sustainability, notably by address-
ing the capability shortfalls identified by the Capa-
bility Development Mechanism (CDM). This has 
3 implications. Firstly, pMS cannot be expected to 
fulfil the criteria at the launching of PSCD: criteria 
must be results-oriented, to be fulfilled by an agreed 
deadline. Secondly, criteria that are unrealistic, 
e.g. spending 2 % of GDP on defence, should be 
avoided. Thirdly, PSCD must not just focus on the 
input, i.e. the level and manner of spending, but on 
the desired output, i.e. on specific deployable capa-
bilities. PSCD is a way of achieving the HG2010 in 
a reasonable timeframe – that is the desired output. 
The following criteria can be envisaged – to be 
seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously: 
Criterion 1•	 : The overall objective of PSCD is that 
pMS increase their current declared level of ambi-
tion in terms of deployability and sustainability 
by an agreed % by an agreed deadline, e.g. by 
25 % in 5 years and by 50 % in 10 years. Thus, if 
PSCoop is launched in 2010, a pMS which now 
has the ambition to always have 1000 troops in 
the field should aim to continually field 1250 by 
2015, and 1500 by 2020. 
Criterion 2•	 : pMS should harmonise their defence 
spending. At the very least, pMS spending less 
than the EU average (at present 1,63 % of GDP) 
should commit not to further decrease their 
defence budget, neither in real terms nor in % of 
GDP. 
Criterion 3•	 : pMS will contribute as a ratio of 
their GDP to the EDA-initiated projects aimed at 
addressing the shortfalls identified by the CDM. 
Criterion 4•	 : In the longer term, e.g. 10 years, pMS 
strive to reach the EU average in terms of defence 
spending per military: € 111.198.– 
The aim of PSCD is not to punish or exclude MS. 
Maximum effect requires encouraging all MS to 
generate more deployable capabilities, by allowing 
as many as possible to participate at their own level 
of means, hence this proposal for realistic but real 
criteria. 
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PSCD as a Permanent Capability Generation 
Conference 
In order to make sure that pMS, when making 
policy on the basis of the criteria above, focus on the 
capabilities that at European level have been com-
monly identified as vital, inspiration can be found 
in the method used to launch CSDP operations: 
a Force Generation Conference. Within PSCD 
the EDA can organise a “Capability Generation 
Conference” aimed at remedying each commonly 
identified shortfall within a reasonable timeframe. 
This implies that pMS are willing: to revisit their 
national defence planning, without any taboos; to 
do away with national capability initiatives proven 
to be redundant; to pool assets and capabilities in 
order to generate savings; to contribute to the pro-
grammes launched to fill the shortfalls in terms of 
GDP, as per criterion 3; and to actively contribute 
to negotiations for as long as it takes to achieve suc-
cess. This would indeed result in a permanent con-
ference – but also in a permanently relevant EDA. 
“End-to-End” Multinational Cooperation: 
Pooling 
The reality is that many MS will not be able to 
meet the criteria and contribute significant capabili-
ties if they maintain the same range of nationally 
organised capabilities that they possess today. There-
fore, identifying the opportunities for multinational 
cooperation is essential, in order to allow pMS to 
maintain relevant capabilities in a cost-effective 
way. The EDA will have a bird’s eye view: based on 
the information which in the context of the CDP 
pMS already provide (and must continually update) 
about their plans and programmes, and in combi-
nation with the progressive results of the Capability 
Generation Conference, it will be able to identify 
opportunities for cooperation. 
Multinational cooperation does not imply that 
all pMS in PSCD cooperate in all capability areas. 
Rather a set of overlapping clusters will emerge, with 
e.g. pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and pMS 
2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. This coopera-
tion can take various forms, from joint procurement 
or development projects but with the aim of after-
wards equipping national formations, to pooling, 
i.e. the creation of permanent multinational forma-
tions. The beauty of PSCD is its flexibility. 
The model for pooling can be provided by EATC: 
deployable national assets, in this case transport air-
craft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by 
national personnel, but are co-located on one base, 
where all support functions are multinationalised, as 
are the command and control arrangements. Thus 
pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS has 
to guarantee that its personnel in the support and 
command and control structures will be available 
whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft – but no pMS 
is obliged to deploy its own actual aircraft each and 
every time another pMS deploys its aircraft for a 
specific operation. The same model can be applied 
to fighter wings or army divisions. Obviously, pool-
ing is easier when pMS use the same equipment, 
hence smaller pMS especially will inevitably take 
into account whom they want to cooperate with as 
a major factor in procurement decisions. For pool-
ing to increase cost-effectiveness, national structures 
and bases must naturally be cut.
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4 eXTernal aCTion of  THe euroPean union 
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4.1 euroPean CounCil and iTS 
PreSidenT
The European Council was created in 1974 
with the intention of establishing an informal 
forum for discussion between Heads of State 
or Government. It rapidly developed into the 
body which fixed goals for the Union and set 
the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU 
activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function 
as providing the impetus and general political 
guidelines for the Union's development. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it has become 
an institution. Its President is Herman Van 
Rompuy.
The European Council defines the general 
political direction and priorities of the European 
Union. It provides the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and defines its 
general political directions and priorities. 
The European Council does not exercise leg-
islative functions.
The European Council consists of the Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States, 
together with its President and the President of 
the Commission. 
The High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part 
in its work. 
When the agenda so requires, the members 
of the European Council may decide each to be 
assisted by a minister and, in the case of the 
President of the Commission, by a member of 
the Commission.
The European Council meets twice every 
six months and is convened by its President. 
When the situation so requires, the President 
will convene a special meeting of the European 
Council.
Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, 
decisions of the European Council are taken by 
consensus. In some cases, it adopts decisions 
by unanimity or by qualified majority, depend-
ing on what the Treaty provides for.
The European Council elects its President 
by a qualified majority. The President's term of 
office is two and a half years, renewable once.
The European Council usually meets in Brus-
sels, in the Justus Lipsius building. It is assisted 
by the General Secretariat of the Council.
The President of the European Council:
Herman Van Rompuy
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The Council building “Justus Lipsius”
Meeting Room in the Justus Lipsius building
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4.2 HigH rePreSenTaTive of THe 
union for foreign affairS and 
SeCuriTy PoliCy
At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19 
November, ahead of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December, EU Heads of 
State or Government agreed on the appoint-
ment of Ms Catherine Ashton as the High 
Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy.
duTieS of THe Hr
The HR exercises, in foreign affairs, the func-
tions which, have hitherto been performed by 
the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the High 
Representative for CFSP and the Commis-
sioner for External Relations. 
In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, the High Repre-
sentative:
conducts the Union's Common Foreign and •	
Security Policy (CFSP);
contributes by her proposals to the develop-•	
ment of that policy, which she will carry out 
as mandated by the Council, and ensures 
implementation of the decisions adopted in 
this field;
presides over the •	 foreign affairs Council;
is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Com-•	
mission. She ensures the consistency of the 
Union's external action. She is responsible 
within the Commission for responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations and for 
coordinating other aspects of the Union's 
external action.
represents the Union in matters relating to •	
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
conduct political dialogue with third par-
ties on the Union's behalf and expresses the 
Union's position in international organisa-
tions and at international conferences.
exercises authority over the European Exter-•	
nal Action Service (EEAS) and over the 
Union delegations in third countries and at 
international organisations.
SuPPorTing arrangemenTS 
In fulfilling her mandate, the HR is assisted 
by a European External Action Service (EEAS). 
She also benefits from support from the Coun-
cil and Commission services as appropriate.
The High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
Catherine Ashton
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4.3 euroPean eXTernal aCTion 
ServiCe
general
Article 27(3) TEU constitutes the legal basis 
for the Council decision on the organisation 
and functioning of the EEAS. “In fulfilling his 
mandate, the HR shall be assisted by a EEAS. 
This service shall work in cooperation with the 
diplomatic services of the Member States and 
shall comprise officials from relevant depart-
ments of the General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil and of the Commission as well as staff sec-
onded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States …”
TaSkS of THe eeaS
The EEAS will help the HR to ensure the con-
sistency and coordination of the Union's exter-
nal action and prepare policy proposals and 
implement them after their approval by Coun-
cil. It will also assist the President of the Euro-
pean Council and the President as well as the 
Members of the Commission in their respec-
tive functions in the area of external relations 
and will ensure close cooperation with the 
Member States. 
The EEAS should be composed of single 
geographical (covering all regions and coun-
tries) and thematic desks, which will continue 
to perform under the authority of the HR the 
tasks currently executed by the relevant parts 
of the Commission and the Council Secretar-
iat. Trade and development policy as defined 
by the Treaty should remain the responsibility 
of the relevant Commissioners.
organiSaTional aSPeCTS
The EEAS should have an organisational 
status reflecting and supporting its unique 
role and functions in the EU system. The EEAS 
should be a service sui generis separate from 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It 
should have autonomy in terms of administra-
tive budget and management of staff.
EEAS staff will be appointed by the HR and 
drawn from three sources: relevant depart-
ments of the General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil, of the Commission and of national diplo-
matic services of the Member States. 
A balanced representation between the dif-
ferent categories must be ensured. When the 
EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from 
Member States should represent at least one 
third of EEAS staff (AD level), including diplo-
matic staff in delegations. In addition, some 
supporting staff should also come from Mem-
ber States. Staff from Member States should 
be present in the EEAS from the outset, includ-
ing in senior positions in Brussels and EU del-
egations.
 The Commission's delegations will become 
Union delegations under the authority of the 
HR and will be part of the EEAS structure. They 
will work in close cooperation with diplomatic 
services of the Member States. They should 
play a supporting role as regards diplomatic 
and consular protection of Union citizens in 
third countries.
In order to enable the High Representative 
to conduct the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), the Crisis Management and Plan-
ning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military 
Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS while 
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sion on the organisation and functioning of 
the EEAS. The HR should submit his/her pro-
posal with a view to it being adopted at the 
latest by the end of April 2010. 
A second stage for setting up the EEAS, from •	
the adoption of the Council Decision to full 
cruising speed. A first status report should 
be made in 2012.
When the EEAS has been functioning for •	
some time at full speed, there should be a 
review of the functioning and organisation 
of the EEAS followed, if necessary, by a 
revision of the decision. This review should 
also cover the scope of the EEAS, including 
delegations' role in consular affairs. Such a 
review should take place in 2014.
CSDP structures are under the authority of 
the European Council and the Foreign Affairs 
Council. They differ from structures support-
ing other European policies because of the 
requirement for unanimity of decision-making 
at all levels.
taking full account of the specificities of these 
structures and preserving their particular func-
tions, procedures and staffing conditions. The 
Situation Centre (SitCen) should be part of the 
EEAS, while putting in place the necessary 
arrangements to continue to provide other rel-
evant services to the European Council, Coun-
cil and the Commission. 
Effective consultation procedures should 
be established between the EEAS and the 
services of the Commission with external 
responsibilities, including those in charge 
of internal policies with significant external 
dimensions.
The EU Special Representatives (EUSR) or 
their tasks should be integrated into the EEAS.
The High Representative should regularly 
consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/
CSDP. Close contacts with the European Parlia-
ment will take place at working level. The EEAS 
should therefore contain functions responsible 
for relations with the European Parliament.
There will be several stages before the shape 
of the EEAS is finalised. The Council will be 
fully involved throughout the whole process.
A first stage from the entry into force of the •	
Treaty to the adoption of the Council Deci-
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
For more information and updated infor-
mation you can consult two different 
homepages: 
European Council/President:  
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/ 
the-president.aspx
European External Action Service:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
4.4 overview of THe main 
CounCil bodieS
The Permanent representatives Committee 
(COREPER) and the Political and Security Com-
mittee prepare the work of the Council, with 
COREPER preparing the work of the Council as 
a whole and the PSC dealing with political and 
security issues. 
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The Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
is the linchpin of CFSP and CSDP. It meets at 
the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body 
for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are 
keeping track of the international situation, and 
helping to define policies within the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP including 
CSDP. It prepares a consistent EU response to 
a crisis and exercises its “political control and 
strategic direction” in times of crisis. 
The european military Committee (EUMC) 
is the highest military body set up within the 
Council. It is composed of the Chief of Defence 
of the Member States, who are regularly rep-
resented by their permanent Military Repre-
sentatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with 
advice and recommendations on all military 
matters within the EU. The EUMC is supported 
by the EU Military Staff.
In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised 
by the Committee for Civilian aspects of Cri-
sis management (CIVCOM). This committee 
provides information, recommendations, and 
gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects 
of crisis management. 
The Politico-military group (PMG) is respon-
sible for the politico-military aspects of the 
CSDP. Similar to the CIVCOM, it formulates 
recommendations and advice for the PSC on 
the politico-military aspects of crisis manage-
ment.
Another group, not mentioned in the dia-
gram, is the working group of foreign rela-
tions Counsellors (Relex Group). This group 
deals with all horizontal aspects in particular 
the institutional, legal and budgetary issues. 
It prepares e.g. the Council Joint Actions 
required for the launching of the EU's crisis 
management missions and operations. It also 
monitors the ATHENA mechanism (funding of 
military operations). 
euroPean CounCil 
CommiTTee of PermanenT rePreSenTaTiveS
(CorePer)
foreign affairS CounCil 
High representative of the union for 
 foreign affairs and Security Policy
and vice-President of the european
Commission (Hr/vP)
Political and Security Committee 
(PSC)
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eXTernal
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when established 
includes i.a.:
CmPd, CPCC
eumS and SiTCen
Relevant 
services
of the 
Council
Secretariat
CivCom
Committee for
Civilian
Aspects of
Crisis 
Management
eumC 
EU Military
Committee
eumCwg
(Working
Group)
Pmg
Politico-
Military
Group
Relevant 
services
in the 
Commis-
sion
policy-making body
supporting/advisory body
STruCTureS in THe field of CfSP/CSdP
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4.5 role of THe  
euroPean CommiSSion
The Commission is fully associated with 
CFSP and it has the right to put forward initia-
tives on any question relating to CFSP. It par-
ticipates in decision-shaping, including at the 
Political and Security Committee which is the 
linchpin of CFSP. And it is always present in 
political dialogue meetings with third coun-
tries.
Crisis management lies at the heart of the 
CFSP. The Common Security and Defence Pol-
icy which is an integral part of CFSP, was given 
a range of crisis management functions (known 
as the “Petersberg tasks”) under the Amster-
dam Treaty. They include inter alia humani-
tarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping, 
and combat operations in crisis management, 
including peace-making. Some of these are 
clearly military, and here the Commission has 
no role, except to ensure that civilian activities 
which follow on a military crisis operation pro-
ceed smoothly and coherently. 
At the Feira European Council in 2000, a 
number of civilian crisis management tasks 
were also attributed to ESDP. Since then, there 
is often no clear distinction between purely 
civilian ESDP “crisis management” operations 
and activities which the Commission has been 
carrying out, in some cases for years, as part of 
development policy or humanitarian aid. This 
is the case, for e.g., operations to reinforce the 
rule of law such as those the Council has car-
ried out in Georgia. 
Furthermore, a whole range of topics which 
come up in CFSP directly affect Community 
policies. These include terrorism, sanctions 
policy, human rights and democracy. The Com-
mission has specific tasks in all these areas, 
and in some it has its own instruments – includ-
ing a whole range of micro and mini-projects 
in the context of the European Initiative on 
Democracy and Human Rights, and electoral 
assistance, observation and monitoring.
The Commission's important role is to man-
age the CFSP budget line. The Community 
budget cannot be used to finance EU military 
operations. But the money earmarked for 
CFSP within the Community budget is allo-
cated inter alia to the financing of civilian crisis 
management missions and it can thus provide 
indirectly useful support to these operations. 
This is possible in particular under the budget 
mechanism of the Instrument for Stability, 
used especially to provide support for CSDP 
missions and operations.
We have learned the lesson that military 
means do not suffice to get a society on its 
feet again. A long-term political solution for 
a region in crisis needs a long-term politi-
cal, financial and administrative commitment 
which normally has wider implications for the 
EU’s future relationships. In these situations, 
the Commission can make a huge contribution 
to a successful CFSP and CSDP. Moreover, the 
lion’s share of the civilian work after a conflict 
– and during it – will often be done by the Com-
munity. 
The European Commission building  
“Berlaymont”
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4.6 role of THe  
euroPean ParliamenT 
general
The European Parliament developed a strong 
consensus in support of the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (as an integral part of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy) 
during the 6th legislative term (2004 to 2009). 
This consensus can be seen in the adoption 
of several Resolutions on CFSP and in Resolu-
tions approving specific ESDP Operations (incl. 
EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUFOR 
Chad). Already at the start of the 7th legisla-
tive term (2009 to 2014), the European Parlia-
ment has shown its determination to use its 
new Lisbon Treaty powers to assert its parlia-
mentary prerogative over the development of 
both CFSP and the new Common Security and 
Defence Policy 1. This is particularly evident in 
the role of the European Parliament in holding 
a hearing for the Vice-President, who is also 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (VP/HR) and in giving its 
approval of the VP/HR in a vote on the whole of 
the Commission. Furthermore, the European 
Parliament is preparing its consultation with 
the VP/HR (through the adoption of a Resolu-
tion) on the European External Action Serv-
ice as well as having to agree jointly with the 
Council amendments to legislation (on staffing 
and financing) and the Union's budget in order 
for the EEAS to become operational. 
THe role of THe euroPean 
ParliamenT in THe area of CfSP/
CSdP – PoliCy-SHaPing noT PoliCy-
making
The formal role of the European Parliament 
in relation to the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (and, as an integral part of that pol-
icy, the Common Security and Defence Policy) 
stems from its two main roles as stipulated in 
the Treaties i.e. that of political scrutiny and 
budgetary authority. 
From the moment the European Parliament 
endorsed the High Representative as Vice Pres-
ident of the Commission, the development of 
a close working relationship between the HR/
VP and the European Parliament has become 
the focus of attention. Initially this centred on 
the setting up of the EEAS, which was estab-
lished by a European Council Decision follow-
ing consultation with the EP and the consent of 
1 This is clearly stated in the recent adoption of the report by the Chair of AFET, Mr Albertini, “on the Annual 
report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2008, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II, 
Section G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 (2009/2057(INI))”. See also the 
Report by the Chair of SEDE, Mr Danjean on “the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the 
CSDP (2009/2198(INI))”.
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the Commission (Article 27.3). The VP/HR has 
a central role (reaching across the EU institu-
tions and to the Member States) in ensuring 
the consistent and effective formulation of EU 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. In this 
respect the Lisbon Treaty tasks the HR/VP to 
work with the European Parliament (Article 36 
of the Lisbon Treaty), whereby: 
“
The High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
shall regularly consult the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and 
basic choices of the common foreign 
and security policy and the common 
security and defence policy and inform 
it of how those policies evolve. She 
shall ensure that the views of the Euro-
pean Parliament are duly taken into 
consideration.....The European Parlia-
ment may ask questions of the Council 
or make recommendations to it and to 
the High Representative. Twice a year 
it shall hold a debate on progress in 
implementing the common foreign and 
security policy, including the common 
security policy.” 
Therefore the VP/HR Catherine Ashton is the 
new linchpin of EU external action and impor-
tantly her role in relation to the EP is clearly 
spelt out as one of informing, consulting and 
of ensuring the views of the EP are duly taken 
into consideration. 
reinforCing ParliamenT'S 
PrerogaTive: THe Power 
of THe PurSe 
Although these consultative rights do not 
give the EP a decision-making role in the CFSP/
CSDP, they are supplemented by the European 
Parliament role as a budgetary authority. Under 
the Nice Treaty the (rotating) EU Presidency 
took the lead on CFSP/ESDP and was respon-
sible for consulting the European Parliament. 
As the number of civilian ESDP missions grew 
(military missions are funded by MS outside 
the EU budget) from 2004 this made a greater 
demand on the Union's CFSP budget (grow-
ing from approx. 35 million euros prior to 2004 
to approx 280 million in 2010). The Presidency 
therefore had to approach the European Par-
liament as a budgetary authority and regularly 
request increases in the CFSP budget. As part of 
the negotiations on the macro financial budget 
(i.e. the budget for all Community policy areas) 
an “Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between 
the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on budgetary discipline and sound 
financial management” was adopted on 17 
may 2006. This agreement specified that for 
the CFSP budget (predominantly used for con-
tributing to civilian ESDP missions) the Presi-
dency represented by the Chair of the Political 
and Security Committee should consult the EP 
(Foreign Affairs and Budget Committees) at 
least five times a year in order to prepare for 
the adoption of the annual CFSP budget. These 
“Joint Consultation Meetings” have been an 
important forum for the EP to discuss AFET 
and SEDE's views on ESDP missions along-
side the Budget Committees oversight of CFSP 
spending. The meetings symbolise the com-
ing together of Parliament's consultation/scru-
tiny role and budgetary authority in the area of 
Plenum of the European Parliament in Strasbourg
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CFSP. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
and specifically the replacement of the rotating 
Presidency by the VP/HR for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, this IIA will need to be amended 
to reflect the new role of the VP/HR in relation to 
the European Parliament. 
In addition, in order to ensure more flexible 
use of the CFSP budget the Lisbon Treaty (Arti-
cle 41.3 TEU) includes the provision for a deci-
sion establishing the specific procedures for 
guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in 
the Union budget for urgent financing of initia-
tives in the area of CFSP. The Article states that 
this Decision will be taken “after consulting the 
European Parliament”. 
STrengTHening THe 
ParliamenTary legiTimaCy of 
CfSP/CSdP: CooPeraTion wiTH 
naTional ParliamenTS
Another important innovation in the Lisbon 
Treaty can be found in the role of National Par-
liaments and in particular in Protocol Number 
1 (in particular Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty 
which specifies that: 
“
The European Parliament and national 
Parliaments shall determine the organi-
sation and promotion of effective and 
regular interparliamentary cooperation 
within the Union.” This could include 
“... the exchange of information and 
best practice between national Parlia-
ments and the European Parliament, 
including their special committees ... 
interparliamentary conferences on spe-
cific topics, in particular to debate mat-
ters of the common foreign and secu-
rity policy, including common security 
and defence policy.”
The EP already invites national Parliaments 
for an annual exchange on the CFSP (includ-
ing ESDP). Significanthy, through the political 
groups, it also reaches national delegations 
and their Parliaments and Parliamentary Par-
ties (some Members of the Parliament even 
have voting rights in national political parties). 
This is important in bridging what is referred 
to as the double democratic deficit, whereby 
the EP has weak decision-making powers but 
very good insight (and increasingly a policy-
shaping role) on CSDP but where national 
Parliaments have stronger formal powers but 
struggle to understand the complexities of EU 
decision making on CFSP (and CSDP). Working 
together the European Parliament and national 
Parliaments can play an important role in giv-
ing CSDP democratic legitimacy. 
ConCluSion 
The innovations in the Lisbon Treaty provide 
an opportunity to improve political consist-
ency in the EU's external representation and 
action. The key role of the VP/HR, supported 
by the EEAS, is central in achieving the objec-
tives of the Union. The political framework for 
consultation and dialogue with the European 
Parliament continue to improve enabling it to 
play a full role in the development of CFSP/
CSDP. As a partner in the development of the 
Union's external relations, the Lisbon Treaty 
enables the European Parliament to play its 
role in helping to address the challenge clearly 
set out in the 2008 Report on the Implementa-
tion of the European Security Strategy which 
states that: 
“
Maintaining public support for our glo-
bal engagement is fundamental. In 
modern democracies, where media and 
public opinion are crucial to shaping 
policy, popular commitment is essential 
to sustaining our commitments abroad. 
We deploy police, judicial experts and 
soldiers in unstable zones around the 
world. There is an onus on govern-
ments, parliaments and EU institutions 
to communicate how this contributes to 
security at home.”
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5SuPPorTing STruCTureS
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5.1 inTernal CriSiS managemenT 
STruCTureS
From the start of CSDP, the EU quickly devel-
oped its crisis management structures to 
present its ability to deploy civilian and mili-
tary crisis management instruments as its spe-
cific strength. The relevant internal services 
supporting the crisis management include in 
particular the Crisis Management and Planning 
Directorate, the Situation Centre, the Civil-
ian Planning and Conduct Capability and the 
Military Staff. The EU is a 'living organisation' 
and CSDP a process developed step by step. 
The EU's crisis management structures mirror 
this process and will therefore further evolve 
in the future. The structures presented in this 
chapter are currently part of the General Sec-
retariat of the Council and will be transferred 
to the External Action Service when it is fully 
established.
CriSiS managemenT and 
Planning direCToraTe (CmPd)
The Crisis Management and Planning Direc-
torate (CMPD) was created in November 2009 
merging the former directorates dealing with 
defence issues and civilian aspects of crisis 
management and the civ-mil cell of the EU 
Military Staff. The directorate is headed by a 
Deputy Director-General. 
The CMPD is responsible for the politico-stra-
tegic level planning of CSDP civilian and mili-
tary missions, and also for supporting the vari-
ous aspects of CSDP development. It represents 
an integrated capability, seeking to develop and 
exploit the synergies between the civilian and 
military elements of CSDP as part of the com-
prehensive approach to crisis management.
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The planning function covers the strategic 
planning of missions from the advanced and 
contingency stage through to the production 
of the crisis management concept, and also the 
subsequent strategic oversight of missions as 
appropriate. This is undertaken by integrated 
planning teams composed of civilian and mili-
tary planners, and including judicial, police, 
rule of law, gender and human rights experts.
The CSDP development function covers 
a wide range of areas and is spread across 2 
units. It includes both military and civilian 
aspects of capabilities, partnerships with other 
crisis management actors, including NATO, 
UN, AU and 3rd States, and finally exercises, 
training, concepts, lessons learned. CMPD also 
provides support to Council bodies on CSDP-
related issues. 
The CMPD is currently part of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and will be trans-
ferred to the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) when it is established.
eu SiTuaTion CenTre (eu SiTCen)
The EU needs timely intelligence to make wise 
policy decisions in order to maintain “a secure 
Europe in a better world” (ESS). The EU Situation 
Centre (EU SITCEN) is providing early warning, 
situational awareness and intelligence analysis 
to assist policy development in the areas of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
and Counter Terrorism.
The SITCEN contributes to the work of the 
General Secretariat by:
providing all-source assessment on CFSP •	
issues and assessment of the terrorist threat 
to the Union and its Member States;
providing 24/7 support for the day-to-day •	
conduct of CSDP crisis management opera-
tions;
providing support for the functioning of the •	
EU-Crisis Coordination Arrangements; 
operating the secure communications net-•	
works linking the foreign affairs, defence, 
intelligence and security communities of the 
Member States and the Institutions.
On the basis of open source and classified 
information coming from Member States and 
the European institutions, SITCEN monitors 
and assesses international events 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. The focus lies on sensitive 
geographical areas, terrorism and the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction. The 
information and evaluations provided by EU 
SITCEN are of a civilian and military nature, 
covering all aspects of EU crisis management. 
The SITCEN is also the EU focal point for Sit-
uation Centres/Crisis Cells in Members States 
and in international organisations (UN, OSCE, 
NATO etc.), as well as in relevant third coun-
tries.
The SITCEN acquired its analysis and assess-
ment functions in 2002. It has three units: the 
Operations Unit, the Analysis Unit and the 
Consular Unit. 
The EU's SITCEN is currently part of the 
General Secretariat of the Council and will be 
transferred to the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) when it is established.
Civilian Planning and 
ConduCT CaPabiliTy (CPCC) 
Established in August 2007, the Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has a 
mandate 
to plan and conduct civilian CSDP missions •	
under the political control and strategic 
direction of the Political and Security Com-
mittee;
to provide assistance and advice in particu-•	
lar to the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
to direct, coordinate, advise, support, super-•	
vise and review civilian CSDP missions in 
the areas of police, border assistance man-
agement, rule of law and security-sector 
reform.
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CPCC is located in Brussels and currently part 
of the General Secretariat of the Council. It will 
be transferred to the European External Action 
Service when it is established. 
It currently has a total staff of about 60, com-
bining officials and seconded national experts 
(largely senior police officers as well as rule 
of law, procurement, logistics and finance 
experts).
CPCC works in close cooperation with the 
European Commission.
The CPCC Director, as EU Civilian Operations 
Commander, exercises command and control at 
strategic level for the planning and conduct of 
all civilian crisis management operations, under 
the political control and strategic direction of the 
Political and Security Committee and the overall 
authority of the High Representative.
CPCC's main deliverable is a unified and clear 
chain of command for civilian CSDP missions. 
Some 3,000 men and women are currently serv-
ing in three continents under the civilian CSDP. 
CPCC is responsible for their well-being and pro-
tection on a 24/7 basis and supports them in the 
day-to-day conduct of the missions. This support 
ranges from administration and finance to the 
processing of mission-related planning docu-
ments and regular reports through the Council 
preparatory bodies. 
euroPean union miliTary 
STaff (eumS)
As a result of the Nice Treaty which decided 
to establish permanent political and military 
structures, the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS) was created to provide ‘military exper-
tise and support to the CSDP, including the 
conduct of EU-led military crisis management 
operations.
The EUMS operational mission is to perform 
early warning and situation assessment and to 
participate in strategic planning for missions 
and tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the 
EU, including those identified in the European 
Security Strategy.
The role and tasks of the EUMS have some 
unique characteristics. On one hand, the EUMS 
is an integral part of the EU crisis management 
structures and directly attached to the HR, pro-
viding in-house military expertise. On the other 
hand, it operates under the military direction of 
the EU Military Committee, to which it assists 
and reports. While this arrangement could be 
viewed as complex, it provides a critical link 
between the Armed Forces of the Member 
States and the Council. 
The EUMS also works in close cooperation 
with other EU crisis management bodies, nota-
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bly the CMPD, SITCEN and CPCC. The EUMS 
will be part of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) as soon as it is established. 
The EUMS's structure and organization 
is fully multinational and comprises around 
200 military personnel seconded by Member 
States and acting in an international capacity, 
as well as civil servants and it is headed by a 
Director General, a 3-star flag officer.
The Concepts and Capabilities directorate 
consists of 3 branches (Concepts, Force Capa-
bility, and Exercises/Training/Analysis) and 
is responsible for EUMS concepts, doctrine, 
capability development, including crisis man-
agement exercises, training, analysis and les-
son learnt, and it is the lead Directorate for co-
operation with the European Defence Agency 
(EDA). 
The intelligence directorate consists of 
3 branches (Intelligence Policy, Intelligence 
Requirements, and Intelligence Production). It 
contributes to intelligence support for the work 
of the EU. It provides intelligence input to early 
warning, situation assessment and advance 
planning. It is responsible for geospatial intel-
ligence and also provides intelligence support 
for crisis response planning and assessments 
for operations and exercises.
The operations directorate plans EU-led 
military crisis management operations, assists 
in strategic advance and crisis response plan-
ning, including early military planning in sup-
port of informed decision-making. It monitors 
all CSDP military operations and is responsible 
for generating the capacity to plan and run an 
autonomous operation. Within Ops Directo-
rate there are 3 branches: Crisis Response/
Current Operations, Military Assessment and 
Planning and Operations Centre/Watchkeeping 
Capability. With effect from 1 January 2007, 
the EU Operations Centre is considered the 
third option for commanding, from Brussels, 
missions and operations of limited size. Thus, 
some EUMS core staff, “double-hatted” EUMS 
officers and “augmentees” from the Member 
States, allow an increased capacity to respond 
to crisis management situation.
The logistics directorate serves as a focal 
point for all matters in the functional areas of 
logistics, contributes to the EUMS planning 
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through the provision of logistic planning 
expertise, is responsible for logistic concepts 
and doctrine, provides the logistic element of 
crisis response planning and assessment for 
operations and exercises and provides support 
to the EUMS. The LOG Directorate consists of 
3 branches: Logistics Policy, Resource Support 
and Administration.
The Communications and information Sys-
tem directorate contributes to the develop-
ment of policies and guidance for the imple-
mentation, operation and maintenance of CIS, 
in support of CSDP activities. It contributes to 
EUMS planning through the provision of CIS 
planning expertise at the strategic and opera-
tional level, and provides the CIS element of 
crises response planning and assessment for 
operations and exercises. It contributes to the 
development of the GSC and CSDP CIS secu-
rity policy and architecture. It provides IT sup-
port and maintenance to the EUMS and the EU 
Operation Centre. It consists of 2 branches: 
CIS Policy and Requirements and Information 
Technology Security.
The executive office coordinates the EUMS 
internal staffing procedures and the flow of 
information both internally and externally. 
The Chairman military Committee Support 
unit serves as the focal point for supporting 
the CEUMC and CEUMC WG in the prepara-
tion, execution and evaluation of EUMC/EUM-
CWG meetings and acts as the interface/liaison 
between CEUMC office and the EUMS. 
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
For more and updated information see 
homepage European Council/CSDP: 
European Council/President:  
http://www.european-council.
europa.eu/CSDP/CSDP 
Structures and instruments/EU Military Staff
The eu Cell at SHaPe prepares for EU 
operations having recourse to NATO common 
assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus 
arrangements and supports DSACEUR in his 
role as the potential operational commander 
for an EU-led operation. It contributes to full 
transparency between NATO and the EU and 
embodies their strategic partnership in crisis 
management.
In addition, an eumS military liaison officer 
to the united nations is established in New 
York to further enhance cooperation between 
the military parts of the two organisations 
and a NATO liaison team is also present at the 
EUMS.
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5.2 agenCieS in THe field of CSdP
euroPean defenCe agenCy (eda)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was 
established under a Joint Action of the Council 
of Ministers on 12 July 2004, 
“
to support the Member States and the 
Council in their effort to improve Euro-
pean defence capabilities in the field of 
crisis management and to sustain the 
European Security and Defence Policy 
as it stands now and develops in the 
future”. 
funCTionS and TaSkS
The European Defence Agency, within the 
overall mission set out in the Joint Action, is 
allocated four tasks, covering:
development of defence capabilities; •	
promotion of Defence Research and Techno-•	
logy (R&T); 
promotion of armaments co-operation; •	
creation of a competitive European Defence •	
Equipment Market and strengthening the 
European Defence, Technological and Indus-
trial Base.
All these tasks relate to improving Europe's 
defence performance, by promoting consist-
ency. A more integrated approach to capability 
development will contribute to better defined 
future requirements on which co-operation – in 
armaments or R&T or the operational domain 
– can be built. More co-operation will, in turn, 
provide opportunities for industrial restructur-
ing and progress towards a continental-wide 
demand and market, which industry needs.
The EDA is an agency of the European Union 
and therefore under the direction and authority 
of the Council, which issues guidelines to and 
receives reports from the High Representative 
(HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy as Head of the Agency. Detailed control 
and guidance, however, is the job of the Steering 
Board. 
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The HR chairs the Steering Board, the principal 
decision-making body of the Agency, made up of 
Defence Ministers from 26 participating Member 
States (all EU members except Denmark) and a 
member of the European Commission. 
In addition to ministerial meetings at least 
twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the 
level of national armaments directors, national 
research directors, national capability planners 
and policy directors.
The Chief Executive, his Deputies and 
the Directors together form the agency manage-
ment board (AMB), supported by the Planning & 
Policy Unit.
The Capabilities directorate works with par-
ticipating Member States (pMS) to: 
develop defence capabilities to support CSDP •	
as it stands now and will evolve in the future, on 
the basis of a Capability Development Plan; and
pool efforts and resources in the development •	
of transformed, interoperable and cost effec-
tive armed forces.
Promoting and enhancing european arma-
ments Co-operation is central to the mission of 
the European Defence Agency to improve Euro-
pean military capabilities. In October 2008 the 
European Armaments Co-operation Strategy 
(EAC) was approved by the Agency’s Steering 
Board. It provides a clear statement of intent on 
the part of the participating Member States to 
promote and enhance more effective European 
armaments co-operation in support of the Com-
mon Security Defence Policy (CSDP).
The industry & market directorate works to 
create a more competitive defence equipment 
market and a stronger defence technological and 
industrial base in Europe.
The research and Technology (r&T) directo-
rate is responsible for the achieving Agency’s 
goal of enhancing the effectiveness of European 
Defence Research & Technology by: 
acting as a catalyst for more European R&T •	
collaboration, focussed on improving defence 
capabilities; and
developing policies and strategies to •	
strengthen defence technology in Europe.
eu SaTelliTe CenTre (euSC)
The Centre was founded in 1992 under the 
WEU and incorporated as an agency into the 
European Union on 1 January 2002. It is located 
in Torrejón de Ardoz, in the vicinity of Madrid, 
Spain.
In line with the European Security Strategy, 
the Satellite Centre supports decision-making 
in the field of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), in particular of the Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP), including Euro-
pean Union crisis management operations, by 
providing products resulting from the analysis 
of satellite imagery and collateral data, including 
aerial imagery and related services. 
Furthermore, the Centre ensures close coop-
eration with Community space-related service. It 
also maintains contacts with other national and 
international institutions in the same field.
The staff of the Centre consists of experien-
ced image analysts, geospatial specialists 
and support personnel from EU Member 
States. The Centre also hosts seconded ex-
perts from Member States and Third States. 
The EUSC Board, consisting of representatives 
from Member States and the EU Commission, 
appoints the Director and approves the annual 
budget as well as the work programme of the 
Centre. Furthermore, the Board serves as a fo-
rum for discussion on issues related to the Cen-
tre’s functioning, staff and equipment. It meets 
at least twice per year, but in practice more of-
ten, and is chaired by the High Representative or 
his representative. 
The EU Satellite Centre may be tasked not 
only by the Council and its bodies, but also 
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
Further details are set out in the Joint 
Action establishing the European 
Defence Agency. This and more up-to-
date information can be found on the 
EDA’s webpage:  www.eda.europa.eu
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by  the EU Commission, EU Member States and 
Third States. If the request is relevant in the field 
of CFSP, in particular the CSDP,  international 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN), 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
and the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) may also task the Centre. 
As regards the UN is the support provided to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan.
The Satellite Centre’s areas of priority reflect 
the key security concerns as defined by the 
European Security Strategy, such as monitoring 
regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. For example, the EUSC gives, 
support to EU operational deployment (such as 
EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR 
R.D. Congo) and humanitarian aid missions and 
peacekeeping missions. The Centre is also an 
important early warning tool, facilitating infor-
mation for early detection and possible preven-
tion of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. 
The Centre carries out tasks in support of the 
following activities:
general security surveillance of areas of interest•	
Petersberg type tasks,•	
support for humanitarian and rescue tasks,•	
support for peacekeeping tasks,•	
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, •	
including peacemaking,
treaty verification,•	
contingency planning,•	
arms and proliferation control (including •	
Weapons of Mass Destruction),
support for exercises,•	
other activities, such as judicial investigations.•	
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
More information on the tasks of the dif-
ferent divisions and on the work and the 
projects of the EUSC in general can be 
found on its webpage: www.eusc.europa.eu
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eu inSTiTuTe for SeCuriTy 
STudieS (eu iSS)
The EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) 
was established by the Council Joint Action of 
20 July 2001 (revised by Council Joint Action 
of 21 December 2006) as a replacement for the 
Western European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (established in July 1990). It was inau-
gurated on 1 January 2002. 
The European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) is located in Paris, operating 
in the framework of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Its goals are to find a 
common security culture for the EU, to help 
develop and project the CFSP, and to enrich 
Europe’s strategic debate. 
The board of the EUISS is chaired by the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. 
The EUISS is an autonomous agency with 
full intellectual freedom. As a think tank, it 
researches security issues of relevance for 
the EU and provides a forum for debate. In its 
capacity as an EU agency, it also offers analy-
ses and forecasting to the Council of the Euro-
pean Union. 
The Institute has two supervisory bodies: 
the Political and Security Committee is its 
political interlocutor. A Board, chaired by the 
High Representative, lays down its budgetary 
and administrative rules. 
research. The EUISS covers all areas related 
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), including the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), and it approaches its 
research from both geographic and thematic 
perspectives. Its research fellows are comple-
mented by an extensive network of external 
researchers who contribute to the Institute’s 
research activities on an ad hoc basis. 
Publications. The Institute’s flagship publica-
tion is its monograph series of Chaillot Papers. 
The Institute also publishes occasional papers, 
books, reports, and shorter policy briefs and 
analyses, as well as a quarterly newsletter. 
Seminars and conferences. The Institute 
organises regular seminars and conferences. 
They bring together academics, EU officials, 
national experts, decision-makers and NGO 
representatives from the 27 Member States 
but also from the rest of the world. At the Insti-
tute’s Annual Conference the EU High Repre-
sentative delivers his address on the state of 
the CFSP. 
Co-operation. The Institute co-operates with 
numerous counterpart institutions in Europe 
the United States and beyond, plays an essen-
tial role in the development of CFSP concepts. 
The EU ISS is also a permanent network 
member of the European Security and Defence 
College.
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
For more information on the EU ISS and its 
publications you can consult its webpage
http://www.iss.europa.eu. 
You can also subscribe to be kept up to date 
on the latest EUISS publications and analy-
sis with email alerts.
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6 THe eu aS an aCTive Player
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6.1 CSdP miSSion SPeCTrum – 
from PeTerSberg To liSbon
HiSToriCal baCkground
The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in Febru-
ary 1992 and establishing the European Union, 
was a milestone in the development of the EU’s 
involvement in the field of Foreign and Security 
Policy. At that time the EU had no operational 
capacities but a clear political will to evolve 
into a global actor. Therefore the operational 
tasks were given to another organisation, the 
Western European Union (WEU), which was 
reactivated during the disintegration process 
of the Yugoslav Republic.
In June 1992 at a Council of Ministers of the 
Western European Union in Petersberg, a con-
ference location near Bonn/Germany, the WEU 
gave itself their new tasks:
“
4. Apart from contributing to the com-
mon defence in accordance with Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V 
of the modified Brussels Treaty respec-
tively, military units of WEU Member 
States, acting under the authority of the 
WEU, could be employed for:
humanitarian and rescue tasks;•	
peacekeeping tasks;•	
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-•	
agement, including peacemaking.”
These tasks were incorporated in the legal 
framework of the European Union by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1997. With the creation of the 
(Common) European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU established its 
own operational capabilities in the military and 
EUPM: Opening of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Police 
Commander Sven Frederiksen, Commissioner for the EUPM – Sarajevo, 1 January 2003
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civilian field. In 2003 the first ESDP missions 
started, in January a civilian police mission in 
Bosnia (EUPM) and in March a military opera-
tion in FYROM (Concordia).
In the context of the Intergovernmental Con-
ference for a “Treaty establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe”, the so-called “Petersberg 
tasks” were revisited and extended. Besides 
this task catalogue, some other missions were 
included which will have an impact on the 
capability development of the CSDP instru-
ments, namely the solidarity clause and a 
mutual assistance clause.
CSdP miSSion SPeCTrum
Although the “Treaty establishing a Consti-
tution for Europe” was not ratified, the task 
catalogue was transferred unchanged to the 
Treaty of Lisbon. After the end of the ratifica-
tion process and the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, from 1 December 2009 the 
mission spectrum is as follows:
“
Art. 42 TEU: “1. The common security 
and defence policy shall be an integral 
part of the common foreign and secu-
rity policy. It shall provide the Union 
with an operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets. The Union 
may use them on missions outside the 
Union for peace-keeping, conflict pre-
vention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter. The 
performance of these tasks shall be 
undertaken using capabilities provided 
by the Member States.”
 Art. 43 TEU: “1. The tasks referred to 
in Article 42(1), in the course of which 
the Union may use civilian and military 
means, shall include joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-
making and post-conflict stabilisation. 
All these tasks may contribute to the 
fight against terrorism, including by 
supporting third countries in combat-
ing terrorism in their territories.”
Some argue that the scope of the CSDP 
task catalogue did not expand compared to 
the Petersberg tasks from 1992. Taking into 
account the fact that the Petersberg tasks made 
a reference to a framework including missions 
from search and rescue to peace-making, eve-
rything which is now stated in Art. 42 TEU was 
already within this framework.
Others argue that the scope expanded 
because new capabilities are addressed. For 
example disarmament operations, military 
advice and assistance tasks could require tools 
other than those which were planned to exe-
cute the Petersberg tasks.
Regardless whether the original Petersberg 
tasks were enlarged compared to the CSDP 
task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, the new hori-
zontal task “terrorism” was introduced, which 
is new and will have an impact on the fight 
against terrorism.
Besides this CSDP task catalogue, another 
challenge for the CSDP is the newly introduced 
mutual assistance clause in Art. 42 (7) TEU:
“
7. If a Member State is the victim of 
armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Austrian Patrol
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the United Nations Charter. This shall 
not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policy of cer-
tain Member States.
 Commitments and cooperation in this 
area shall be consistent with commit-
ments under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, which, for those States 
which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence 
and the forum for its implementation.”
The mutual assistance clause is based on 
the UN principle of collective self-defence and 
underlines the EU guiding principle of solidar-
ity. The content differs compared to similar 
paragraphs in other treaties (e.g. NATO, WEU). 
For example the application of this clause is 
based on “armed aggression”, which is more 
extensive than an “armed attack”. The geo-
graphical area refers to the territory of the EU 
Member States, which could be seen as a vir-
tually worldwide responsibility. And finally the 
means for assistance are not limited to military 
or civilian assets, but must be interpreted to be 
as comprehensive as the full engagement of 
the EU in the field of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.
Nevertheless the various types of Member 
States are respected: those which are neutral, 
non-allied and members of NATO.
TerroriSm
Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task 
catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the 
mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and 
explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 
TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the Euro-
pean Union will face the phenomenon “terror-
ism” within and outside the EU, preventively 
or in the form of consequence management. 
There are no clear indications whether one rule 
will be preferred in practice. One could argue 
that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual 
assistance clause are designed for the fight 
against terrorism outside the territory of the 
EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the 
rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against 
terrorism in the sense of preventive engage-
ment remains an open question.
By including the task “fight against terror-
ism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty 
which will influence capability development in 
the EU, the Union made a clear and promising 
statement that it will be ready and prepared 
to face the challenge and protect its citizens 
worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.
geograPHiCal SCoPe of 
THe miSSion SPeCTrum
The CSDP task catalogue was created for 
missions abroad, whereas the mutual assist-
ance clause prioritises operations to fight 
armed aggression inside and preventively also 
outside the EU.
EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine: 
Border Control – 19 February 2008
Civilian Missions
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In 2000 to 2003, the EU evolved and gave 
itself Crisis Management Procedures to facili-
tate the effective co-ordination of the various 
crisis management players and instruments 
used. 
The Crisis Management Procedures differ-
entiate between the following phases (see text 
box). 
6.2 deCiSion making in THe field 
of CSdP
The EU is in a unique situation having at 
its disposal a wide range of instruments and 
means (political, diplomatic, economic, finan-
cial, civilian and military) necessary for effec-
tive international crisis management. This is 
an advantage but at the same time a real chal-
lenge, as described in the European Security 
Strategy (ESS):
“
The challenge now is to bring together 
the different instruments and capa-
bilities: European assistance pro-
grammes and the European Develop-
ment Fund, military and civilian capa-
bilities from Member States and other 
instruments. All this can have an 
impact on our security and on that of 
third countries … Diplomatic efforts, 
development, trade and environmen-
tal policies should follow the same 
agenda. In a crisis there is no substi-
tute for unity of command …” 
CriSiS managemenT PHaSeS
Routine phase1. 
Crisis build-up and elaboration of a Crisis 2. 
Management Concept
Approval of the Crisis Management 3. 
Concept and development of Strategic 
Options
Formal decision to take action and devel-4. 
opment of planning documents
Implementation5. 
Refocusing of EU action and termination 6. 
of mission/operation.
Council Meeting in Brussels
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During Phase 1, the EU – within the Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC) as well as 
within the relevant geographic and thematic 
Council Working Groups – carries out moni-
toring, exchange of information and policy-
shaping. The relevant services in the Council 
Secretariat, and in the future in particulary the 
European External Action Service, contribute 
to monitoring, early warning including situa-
tion assessment, development of policy option 
papers and advance planning. 
Once the attention of the PSC is drawn to a 
developing crisis, it discusses the situation in 
the light of input from relevant actors with a 
view to developing a common political under-
standing of the crisis. In its regular meetings at 
least twice a week, the PSC analyses the situa-
tion and – and a certain stage – considers that 
EU action is appropriate. This is the start of the 
planning processes. 
When the PSC considers that EU action is 
appropriate (Phase 2), a Crisis Management 
Concept is drawn up, describing the EU's 
political interests, the aims and final objec-
tive, together with the major politico-strategic 
options for responding to that particular crisis, 
main deCiSionS
EU action considered appropriate (PSC)1. 
Approval of the CMC (Council)2. 
Decision to take action (Council)3. 
Approval of the CONOPS (Council)4. 
Approval of the OPLAN (Council)5. 
Decision to launch the operation  6. 
(Council)
including the possible exit strategy. This plan-
ning document in particular contributes to the 
overall consistency of the EU action.
Once finalised in the PSC, the CMC is adopted 
by the Council (Phase 3). It then serves as the 
basis for developing strategic options. Depend-
ing on what the conflict context requires, these 
can be military (MSO), police (PSO) or other 
civilian strategic options (CSO). MSOs are pre-
pared by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), 
PSOs and CSOs by the Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The 
PSC identifies which option will be pursued.
The Council can then take a decision to act 
(Phase 4) adopting a Council Joint Action drawn 
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up by the Working Group of Foreign Relations 
Counsellors (Relex Group). This is the legal act 
which establishes the mission or operation, 
appoints the Operation Commander or Head 
of the Mission and decides on the financial 
issues. The appointed Operation Commander 
and/or Head of Mission are then responsible 
for developing the operational planning docu-
ments. The key documents in this regard are 
the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the 
Operation Plan (OPLAN). The first outlines how 
it is intended to implement the operation and 
the latter describes in detail how the operation 
is organised. 
Once the OPLAN has been approved, the 
Council can launch the operation (Phase 5). The 
PSC then exercises “political control and stra-
tegic direction” of the operation. On a regular 
basis, the PSC assesses whether an operation 
needs to be refocused or terminated (Phase 
6). A decision by the Council to terminate an 
operation is followed by a lessons-learned 
process.
These Crisis Management Procedures are 
suggestions for a coherent, comprehensive 
EU crisis management covering every phase 
in a developing crisis. They guide the EU's 
responses to a crisis in a co-ordinated way. 
However, the Crisis Management Procedures 
are rather a set of tools to be used in a flexible 
way. They do not limit the EU to developing its 
approach to a crisis in all the sequences set 
down in the procedures. As shown in the table, 
some of the processes may be skipped alto-
gether e.g. to shorten the process when rapid 
reaction is required as illustrated in the table. 
Closer co-operation with international organi-
sations (e.g. with NATO, using the Berlin-Plus 
arrangements) do also impact the processes. 
Furthermore, many of the processes, such 
as the development of the Crisis Management 
Concept, are iterative in nature and specific 
action such as the appointment of an OHQs 
and an Operation Commander may be made in 
the process at any suitable moment.
62  HANDBOOK CSDP 
6.3 Command and ConTrol 
oPTionS
In the absence of a permanent military com-
mand and control structure, the EU has three 
strategic options for commanding and control-
ling military operations. 
firstly, it can have recourse to NATO assets 
and capabilities using the Berlin-Plus arrange-
ments. In this case, the preferred option is to 
establish the EU Operation Headquarters at 
SHAPE.
Secondly, the EU can have recourse to the 
Member States' assets and capabilities. In this 
case the OHQ will be provided by one of the 
Member States (France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy and UK).
Thirdly, the EU can activate its Operations 
Centre in the EU Military Staff to plan and 
conduct an autonomous EU operation when 
the Council decides to draw on the collective 
capacity of the EU Military Staff for an opera-
tion which requires a civilian as well as a mili-
tary response and when no national Operation 
Headquarters has been identified. 
The following diagram illustrates the differ-
ent command and control structures which 
need to be identified for civilian missions and 
military operations. 
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6.4 Civilian miSSionS and 
miliTary oPeraTionS
Following the development and establish-
ment of its structures and procedures, the EU 
started its operational engagement in 2003 
with fi rst civilian missions (EU Police Missions 
in BiH) and military operations (Operation 
CONCORDIA in FYROM). Since then it con-
ducted more than 20 civilian and military oper-
ations. This handbook will not elaborate on the 
details. The attached world map provides a 
general overview of all past and current civil-
ian missions and military operations. 
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
For each operational activity, detailed and 
updated information, including video pres-
entations, can be found on the webpage of 
the Council: www.consilium.europa.eu 
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or defence implications, a Member States 
abstains in a vote and makes a formal declara-
tion (constructive abstention), it is not obliged 
to contribute to the financing of the respective 
expenditure.
Civilian miSSionS
Civilian missions are funded from the gen-
eral budget of the European Union which is 
decided upon by the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Title 19 of the budget cov-
ers “External Relations”, and its Chapter 3 is 
specifically dedicated to Common Foreign 
and Security Policy ( the “CFSP budget”, as it 
is called). It is implemented by the European 
Commission.
The CFSP budget amounts to just over 280 
million euros in 2010. The relevant sub-divi-
sions (articles) are “Monitoring and imple-
mentation of peace and security processes” 
(commitments of 3 million euros), “Conflict 
resolution and other stabilisation measures” 
(137 million euros), and “Police missions” 
(approx. 61 million euros). In order to be able 
to respond flexibly and finance urgent needs 5 
million euros are provided for under the head-
ing “Emergency measures”.
6.5 finanCing of CSdP aCTionS
legal baSiS
Articles 31 and 41 TEU, Council Deci-
sion 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 
establishing a mechanism to administer the 
financing of the common costs of European 
Union operations having military or defence 
implications (Athena), Articles 313 ff TFEU.
inTroduCTion
External actions of the European Union are 
– thematically and financially – much broader 
than the crisis management operations under 
CSDP. They comprise, among other measures, 
the Development Cooperation Instrument, 
the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian 
Aid. In total the multiannual financial frame-
work provides for a maximum expenditure of 
55.935 million euros for the “EU as a world 
player” during 2007 – 2013. This chapter will, 
however, focus specifically on the principles of 
the financing of crisis management operations 
stricto sensu, i.e., civilian missions and military 
operations.
general ruleS
The TEU lays down the basic rules on the 
financing of crisis management operations. 
According to Article 41 (1) TEU administrative 
expenditure of the institutions arising from 
the implementation of the CSDP, both for civil-
ian missions and military operations, will be 
charged to the budget of the European Union. 
The same applies, as a general rule, to oper-
ating expenditure under Article 41 (2) TEU, 
except for cases (a) where the Council – acting 
unanimously – decides otherwise and (b) for 
such expenditure arising from operations hav-
ing military or defence implications.
If expenditure is not charged to the Union 
budget, it is generally charged to the Member 
States in accordance with their gross national 
product (unless, again, the Council unani-
mously decides otherwise). If , on a decision 
to embark on an operation having military 
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miliTary oPeraTionS
After temporary financing mechanisms for 
operations CONCORDIA and ARTEMIS, the 
Council, in February 2004, established a per-
manent “mechanism to administer the financ-
ing of the common costs of European Union 
operations having military or defence impli-
cations (Athena)”. ATHENA, in capital letters, 
as it is usually referred to, has a permanent 
structure and functional legal capacity. It acts 
on behalf of the participating Member States 
(all MS of the EU, except Denmark), and third 
States, if the latter contribute to the financing 
of the common costs of a specific operation.
Given that the contributions are provided 
by the MS based on a GNI scale (ranging cur-
rently from less than 0,5 % to more than 20 % 
per MS) it may be considered a logical conse-
quence that ATHENA is managed under the 
authority of a Special Committee (SC) which is 
composed of a representative of each partici-
pating MS and takes decisions by unanimity. 
ATHENA basically, covers the incremental 
costs for headquarters, certain infrastructure 
works, medical services, and satellite images 
during the active phase of an operation. Fur-
ther expenditure may be authorised by the SC 
upon request by the Operation Commander 
who bears the overall financial responsibility. 
If the Council so decides, also transport to and 
from the theatre of operations for deployment, 
support and recovery of the forces will be con-
sidered as operational common costs. In addi-
tion, certain measures in the preparatory and 
winding-up phases of an operation are borne 
by ATHENA, as well as specific general costs 
and joint costs of EU exercises.
The 2010 ATHENA budget provides for (in 
commitment appropriations) around 23,1 million 
euros for EUFOR ALTHEA and 9,95 million for 
ATALANTA out of a total of 34,6 million euros. It 
will, however, be adjusted if new operations are 
started. Overall, one has to bear in mind that the 
costs financed in common account for less than 
10% of the total costs for an operation, the rest 
follows the principle “costs lie where they fall”. 
ConCluSion
The ATHENA mechanism is a very flex-
ible instrument for the financing of military 
operations. This also holds true of periodical 
revisions of the mechanism as such. The EU 
budget, in some respects, lacks this flexibility. 
Its advantage, however, lies in the democratic 
control at European level which is exercised by 
the European Parliament as co-legislator of the 
budget.
Above all, the political will to provide suf-
ficient funding, both for civilian and military 
operations, in order to fulfil the respective 
tasks is of paramount importance.
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7CaPabiliTy develoPmenT
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7.1  THe raTionale for euroPean 
CaPabiliTy develoPmenT
The European Union has played a central 
role over recent decades in the construction of 
an economic area. By contrast, Europe has yet 
to emerge as an equally powerful and credible 
player at the level of external policies. It is vital 
that the Europe of the future be more than a bit 
player on the world stage: Europe must be in 
a position to project and protect its core inter-
ests and shared values. That is the common 
political goal of all Member States.
It follows that Europe must speak with one 
voice if its political aspirations are to be effec-
tively articulated and clearly understood. For 
the European Union to emerge as a power-
ful political force at world level, however, it 
must think and act as a Union with respect to 
security and defence. And this is the basis of a 
Common Security and Defence Policy.
Full implementation of the Union's Common 
Security and Defence Policy is a sine qua non 
if Europe's Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy is to be accepted as a credible instrument 
of international policy at the sharp end of cri-
sis management. Only then will the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy be perceived as a 
coherent and comprehensive political, diplo-
matic, economic, humanitarian, civil and mili-
tary instrument. Articulation and implemen-
tation of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy thus emerges as a key priority for the 
European Union. 
If the European Union is to assert and sus-
tain its political credibility and determination, 
it is imperative that it be able to act across 
the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks and 
the new additional tasks defined in the Lis-
bon Treaty. A credible capability for military 
intervention is indispensable to underpin the 
political aspirations of non-violent conflict pre-
vention. Accordingly, the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999 reached agreement 
on development of civilian and military assets 
required to take decisions across the full range 
of conflict prevention and crisis resolution.
As far as military capabilities are concerned, 
the European Headline Goal provides the quan-
titative and qualitative framework for armed 
intervention across the full range of the mis-
sion spectrum. 
On the non-military side, the European 
Union has built up over recent decades an 
arsenal of political, diplomatic and civil instru-
ments which are conducive to the attainment 
of its foreign policy objectives. The crisis in 
the Balkans demonstrated the need to rein-
force and expand those instruments in order 
to improve their effectiveness. The Council has 
taken the view that a number of areas need to 
be addressed including policing, promoting 
the rule of law, strengthening civil administra-
tions, ensuring protection for civilian popula-
tions and monitoring. 
need for Civil-miliTary 
CaPabiliTy develoPmenT
Top-quality civil and military resources and 
assets are indispensable to effective Euro-
pean crisis management. The crises and con-
flicts that beset the international community 
today are, however, of an increasingly com-
plex nature. As a general rule, they are less 
susceptible to traditional military intervention; 
moreover, questions of collective defence are 
increasingly less relevant to the majority of 
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conflicts in today's world. As a result, peace-
keeping operations frequently extend beyond 
mere separation of the belligerent parties by 
military means: they are progressively multi-
functional and are conducted in tandem with 
a series of civil initiatives, including the insti-
tution or reinforcement of civil administra-
tions in a crisis region. What is more, military 
resources and capacities are often used in 
support of essentially civil missions, as in the 
case, for example, of humanitarian missions 
and rescue operations. Bundling and effective 
co-ordination of available assets thus make a 
vital contribution to the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness.
This is particularly true of the European 
Union and its announced intention within the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy to use the full gamut of instru-
ments at its disposal in the best interests of 
conflict prevention and crisis management. 
In effect, the Common Security and Defence 
Policy has combined both civil and military 
resources into a single institutional framework. 
This, in theory, should enable the articulation 
of concepts and methodologies that allow for 
efficient co-ordination of resources at all times 
and at every level. While this is readily accept-
able in theory, however, the fact remains that 
practical implementation represents one of 
the principal challenges facing the Union at 
the present time, inasmuch as the roles and 
responsibilities of civilian and military play-
ers are frequently high disparate and, in some 
instances of civilian-military co-ordination, 
constitute entirely new territory. 
The Swedish Presidency held a seminar in 
Brussels on EU civil-military capability devel-
opment in September 2009 to discuss experi-
ences from CSDP missions and operations and 
discussed prospects for future civilian and mil-
itary capability development. Key findings of 
the seminar were, inter alia that work is already 
ongoing and potential synergies between the 
civilian and the military capability develop-
ment processes should be further explored in 
areas where an added value can be achieved.
 EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Tactical air transport
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Since the Feira Council in 2000, progress has 
been reached in the development of civilian 
capabilities based on a Civilian Headline goal 
2008 set by the Council in 2004. Capability plan-
ning under the Headline Goal 2008 was based 
7.2 develoPmenT of Civilian 
CaPabiliTieS
feira CounCil in june 2000 idenTified four areaS for PrioriTy aCTion 
of Civilian aSPeCTS of CriSiS managemenT:
police, to enable the EU to carry out all its missions, including substitution for failing local •	
authorities; 5000 police officers, 1000 of whom can be deployed within 30 days, were consid-
ered necessary;
rule of law, in order to strengthen the judicial systems called on to supplement the action of •	
the police. The estimated need was for 3000 experts;
civilian administration, in order to create a rapidly-deployable pool of experts to act wherever •	
local government authorities are deemed unable to do so during a crisis;
civil protection, with the identification of three emergency assessment teams for crisis situa-•	
tions, and up to 2000 experts in various fields who could be deployed rapidly with their equip-
ment.
on virtual planning scenarios representing a 
selection of possible situations calling for EU 
action under CSDP. Subsequently, a detailed 
list of personnel for possible civilian missions 
to be launched in those situations was estab-
lished, and Member States were invited to 
indicate personnel that could potentially be 
made available. A comparison between the 
member States' indications and the capabili-
ties required provided a comprehensive pic-
ture of the actual state of EU preparedness for 
civilian CSDP missions.
Thoroughly evaluating the progress made 
with the Headline Goal 2008 and the challenges 
ahead, at the ministerial Civilian Capability 
Improvement Conference in 2007, Ministers 
have decided to adopt the new Headline Goal 
2010. On the basis of this guidance, work on the 
Headline Goal 2010 started in 2008 with a review 
of illustrative scenarios, assessing new required 
capabilities and surveying civilian capabilities. 
The following priority areas were set:
Strengthening the EU's capability to plan and •	
deploy several missions at the same time, in 
particular in rapid-response situations;
EUPOL COPPS – Italy provides, through EUPOL COPPS, 28 
vehicles to the Palestinian Traffic Police, Ramallah, 
22 December 2009
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Continuing to develop suitable management •	
tools for efficiently mobilising capabilities 
needed for civilian missions;
Improving training for personnel likely to •	
be deployed on missions, and continuing to 
strengthen civilian response teams;
Developing the administrative, financial, •	
logistical and human resources aspects of 
the mission support function, including by 
seeking to optimise the synergy between 
civilian and military assets;
Developing national strategies to facili-•	
tate the deployment of mission personnel 
and encourage exchange of good practices 
between Member States;
Strengthening coherence and synergies •	
between CSDP missions and other EU instru-
ments;
Introducing a proper feedback system for •	
CSDP civilian missions.
While keeping the proven planning method-
ology, the added value with the Headline Goal 
2010 is mainly in terms of new, more compre-
hensive scenarios, better exploring co-opera-
tion and co-ordination inside and outside the 
EU, but also in developing and implementing 
specific new concepts and civilian capability 
management tools, as well as addressing more 
quality issues at all levels.
Furthermore, the Headline Goal 2010 sets 
the military and civilian capability develop-
ment processes on a synchronised track, which 
inherently facilitates synergy. 
Civilian Headline goal 
2010 PerSPeCTiveS
Most personnel in civilian crisis manage-
ment missions under CSDP are seconded by 
Member States. Consequently, the wide range 
of different ministries, services, judicial bod-
ies etc., involved in the secondment process 
directly influence the EU's capacity to act. It is 
therefore important to ensure that the Headline 
Goal process findings, ranging from concep-
tual to very practical, would find their way into 
Member States' national administrations. To 
this end, several Civilian Capability Improve-
ment Conferences were held enabling Minis-
ters to guide the Headline Goal 2008 process 
and to enhance its political visibility. 
Several Member States managed to trans-
late recommendations and guidelines emanat-
ing from the Headline Goal process in practical 
terms, often resulting in closer co-operation 
between the different stakeholder ministries 
involved. Several Member States declared that 
they had created structures to better facilitate 
the recruitment, training and deployment of 
personnel. There is a clear task for the EU to 
facilitate and promote equal preparation of 
Member States so that all may usefully contrib-
ute to civilian CSDP. The Headline Goal 2008 
has certainly achieved encouraging results in 
this respect but more needs to be done. 
EUPOL RD Congo: Police officers attend a course  
“sexual violence”, 29 January 2010
C
o
u
n
ci
l o
f 
th
e 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 U
n
io
n
72  HANDBOOK CSDP 
HelSinki Headline goal
To develop European military capabilities, Member States set themselves the headline goal: 
by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then 
sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam treaty, 
including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-
60,000 persons.
These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropri-
ate, air and naval elements.
Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to 
provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.
They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an 
additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide 
replacements for the initial forces.
7.3 develoPmenT of miliTary 
CaPabiliTieS
In June 2004, Member States set themselves 
a new Headline Goal 2010 built upon the Hel-
sinki Headline Goal with a view to achieving 
the objectives set by the European Security 
Strategy. Under the new Headline Goal, the EU 
should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid 
and decisive action to the whole spectrum of 
crisis management operations. The focus is in 
particular on the qualitative aspects of capabil-
ity development and to improve the interoper-
ability and deployability and support capacity 
for the forces.
In the context of the Headline Goal 2010, the 
EU Military Committee is developing the mili-
tary capabilities in several stages (capability 
development process):
The formulation of military capability 1. 
requirements to fulfil the EU's missions, 
leading to the requirements Catalogue.
The identification of the forces made avail-2. 
able by Member States on a voluntary basis, 
leading to the force Catalogue.
The evaluation of contributions against cur-3. 
rent requirements, identifying the principal 
capability shortfalls, leading to the Progress 
Catalogue. This leads also to conclusions for 
crisis management operations and for future 
capability development, formulated in the 
Capability Development Plan.
EUFOR RD CONGO: Real Time Surveillance – 
2 August 2006
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The european defence agency (EDA) is play-
ing a major role in military capability develop-
ment. In October 2006, EU Defence Ministers 
endorsed the “Long-Term Vision”, a paper 
which defines the long-term technological 
developments depending on the nature of the 
EU's future operations. Based on this, the EDA 
is working on the Capability Development Plan 
aiming at 
identifying possibilities for co-operation •	
between Member States, 
encouraging harmonisation of national •	
defence planning, and finally
rendering the Long-Term Vision operational.•	
EDA is making a significant contribution to 
the strengthening of European military capa-
bilities by encouraging Member States to 
increase their co-operation in this field.
The consistency between the EU's capabil-
ity development with that of NATO is ensured 
through a joint eu-naTo Capability group. 
This group was established to ensure the 
transparent and coherent development of 
military capabilities and to provide a forum for 
addressing where relevant the overall consist-
ency and complementarity of proposed spe-
cific goals, commitments and priorities. It is up 
to the EU, NATO and Member States of both 
organisations to draw conclusions from the 
group's discussions in the future development 
of respective goals and capabilities.
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) – 11 February 2009
EUFOR Tchad/RCA receives the Russian 
helicopters – 8 December 2008
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8 Civil-miliTary  Co-ordinaTion
76  HANDBOOK CSDP 
8.1 Civil-miliTary Co-ordinaTion –  
a SPeCifiC requiremenT of THe eu 
THe new STraTegiC environmenT
One of the three strategic objectives defined 
in the European Security Strategy is to tackle 
the key threats identified, including terrorism, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, regional conflicts, state failure and organ-
ised crime. The strategy further concludes that 
none of these threats is purely military, nor can 
any be tackled by purely military means. Each 
requires a mixture of instruments. Prolifera-
tion may be contained through export controls 
and combated through political, economic and 
other pressures while the underlying political 
causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism 
may require a mixture of intelligence, police, 
judicial, military and other means. In failed 
states, military instruments may be needed 
to restore order, with humanitarian means 
used to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional 
conflicts need political solutions but military 
assets and effective policing may be needed in 
the post- conflict phase.
Hence, the new strategic environment calls 
for the deployment of a mixture of instru-
ments, of civilian and military capabilities 
together. Experiences with crisis management 
operations in the recent past showed that an 
operation requires a combination of civilian 
and military tools from the outset. In many 
cases military security is established quickly 
but organised crime and other factors continue 
to thwart a return to normality.
eu in a unique SiTuaTion
In recent years the EU has created a number 
of different instruments, each of which has its 
own structure and rationale. The EU is in such 
a unique position to have at its disposal all the 
means and tools necessary for effective inter-
national crisis management. This is considered 
to be the comparative advantage of the EU. The 
challenge now is to bring together these differ-
ent instruments and capabilities and to ensure 
that they all follow the same agenda.
From the start of its operational engagement 
in international crisis management in 2003, the 
EU has tried to present its ability to deploy 
both civilian and military instruments together 
as its particular strength. However, despite all 
co-ordination efforts, the civilian and military 
structures have remained to great extent dif-
ferent worlds and the civilian and military crisis 
management missions and operations are still 
separate. In this regard the Maastricht Treaty 
also had an impact, with the division of tasks 
between the Council and the Commission lead-
ing to the fragmentation of responsibilities, 
capacities and also budgets. The implementa-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty is now a window of 
opportunity to improve the overall consistency 
of the EU's external actions.
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ProgreSS made in THe 
inSTiTuTional SeTTing
In recent years the Council has taken a 
number of decisions to lay down the condi-
tions for better civil-military co-ordination and 
co-operation, aiming in particular to integrate 
the civilian and military planning structures 
and to launch activities relating to civil-military 
capability development.
A first attempt to create civil-military struc-
tures for the planning and conduct of CSDP 
missions and operations was made at the end 
of 2003. A Civil-Military Cell was established 
within the EU Military Staff to enhance its 
capacity to conduct early warning, situation 
assessment and strategic planning. The cell 
was led by a military director and a civilian 
deputy. All in all, it has proved to be a useful 
step forward towards a better linkage between 
civil and military strategic planning but its 
location within the EU Military Staff has raised 
doubts about its real civil-military character.
In the same context, an Operations Centre 
was established within the EU Military Staff 
which became operational in 2007. The aim 
was to provide for an additional command 
option in particular in cases where a joint civil-
military response might be required and none 
of the national potential Operation Headquar-
ters might be available. 
In response to the lack of a planning and com-
mand structure for civilian missions, a Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was 
created and became operational in 2008. As a 
matter of fact, it is an Operation Headquarters 
for civilian missions only, responsible for the 
operational planning and command of civilian 
missions at the strategic level. The Director of 
the CPCC acts as the Civilian Operation Com-
mander for all civilian missions.
In 2009, a new decision was taken to further 
develop the relevant structures at the strategic 
level, namely to merge the relevant civilian and 
defence directorates in the Council Secretariat 
with the Civ-Mil Cell to form a new Crisis Man-
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Head of Mission Verástegui visits Border Police, 30 June 2009
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agement and Planning Directorate (CMPD). 
This directorate now operates as an integrated 
structure for strategic planning of CSDP opera-
tions and missions and is also dealing with 
CSDP policy and capability issues.
All in all, these are useful organisational and 
institutional steps taken so far at the strate-
gic level which help to improve civil-military 
co-ordination. However, whether this will be 
the final solution is arguable. CSDP is and 
will remain an evolving process, at least in 
the coming decades.. This process might cul-
minate in unified civil-military structures as 
underlined in 2009 by the former Chairman 
of the EU Military Committee, General Henri 
Bentégeat. Referring to the progress made so 
far in civil-military integration, he underlined 
the importance of establishing an integrated 
Civil-Military Headquarters for CSDP missions 
which would, in his view, correspond to a spe-
cific requirement of the European Union.
Civil-miliTary CaPabiliTy 
develoPmenT 
Apart from the institutional and organisa-
tional aspects, consideration is now given to 
possible synergic effects in the field of Euro-
pean capability development. It is recognised 
that further co-ordination of military and civil-
ian efforts is necessary, both at strategic level 
and in theatre, in order to enhance the capabil-
ity of the EU to meet complex challenges in the 
future. Finding synergies between civilian and 
military efforts is also considered to be cost 
efficient for the Member States.
Training and eXerCiSeS 
Following the EU's comprehensive approach 
to crisis management, civil-military co-ordina-
tion is a recognised special training require-
ment for the EU and should be met through 
special training courses and through combined 
civilian and military participation whenever 
possible, in national and EU- level training. 
Aspects of civil-military co-ordination are also 
regularly addressed in EU exercises. 
The European Security and Defence College 
is playing a significant and important role in 
support of the EU's comprehensive approach 
by providing training at strategic level for civil 
and military personnel of the Member States 
and the EU Institutions. Training activities of 
the ESDC bring together diplomats, police, rule 
of law and civil administration staff and mili-
tary personnel, thereby contributing to a bet-
ter mutual understanding. Under the aegis of 
the college there are also training courses cov-
ering specifically civil-military co-ordination 
issues within the EU and in co-operation with 
international organisations and partners.
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
Breaking Pillars – Towards a civil-military 
security approach for the European Union, 
Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, Clingen-
dael Security Paper Nr 13, January 2010. 
Available also via the internet:  
www.clingendael.nl
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN: Carl Bildt visits 
EUPOL, 31 August 2009
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9 oTHer imPorTanT  CSdP-relaTed aSPeCTS
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9.1 Co-oPeraTion wiTH THird 
STaTeS and inTernaTional 
organiSaTionS
“
There are few if any problems we can 
deal with on our own. The threats 
described are common threats, shared 
with all our closest partners. Interna-
tional co-operation is a necessity. We 
need to pursue our objectives both 
through multilateral co-operation in 
international organisations and through 
partnerships with key actors.” 
This quote from the European Security Strat-
egy sets the scene for the EU's co-operation 
with third states and international organisation 
in crisis management.
In line with this, the EU is developing an effec-
tive and balanced partnership with the United 
States in particular in counter-terrorism, the 
fight against the proliferation of WMD and since 
2007 also in crisis management. For the first 
time, the United States committed itself to par-
ticipating in an CSDP mission (EULEX Kosovo).
Special arrangements exists for the involve-
ment of non-EU European allies (Iceland, Nor-
way and Turkey) in EU military operations, in 
compliance with the EU's decision-making 
autonomy.
Special relations in the field of CSDP are also 
developing with Canada, Russia and Ukraine. 
As regards Russia, this has led to the develop-
ment of a roadmap on security identifying also 
practical measures for closer co-operation in 
the field of CSDP. In 2003 Russia contributed to 
the first EU civilian mission (EU Police Mission 
in BiH). In November 2008, it formalised an 
agreement for its contribution to EUFOR Chad/
CAR which represents Russia's first participa-
tion in an EU military operation.
In general, partners interested in making a 
contribution to a EU mission and operation 
are kept informed throughout the planning 
and decision-making process using the exist-
ing structures for political dialogue. At a cer-
tain stage, they are also invited to the relevant 
force-generation conferences. Following the 
decision by the Council to launch the opera-
tion, the Committee of Contributors starts its 
work as the body responsible for the day-to-
day conduct of the operation. Contributing 
partners are represented in the Committee of 
Contributors with the same rights and obliga-
tions as the EU Member States.
The strategic partnership in crisis manage-
ment between the eu and naTo rests on the 
so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements adopted in 
December 2002, under which NATO's collec-
tive assets and capabilities can be made avail-
able to the EU for operations. 
The berlin-Plus arrangements include:
guaranteed access for the EU to NATO plan-•	
ning capabilities for planning its own opera-
tions;
euroPean SeCuriTy STraTegy
“The transatlantic relationship is irreplace-
able. Acting together, the EU and the United 
States can be a formidable force for good 
in the world. Our aim should be an effec-
tive and balanced partnership with the 
USA. This is an additional reason for the 
EU to build up further its capabilities and to 
increase its coherence.”
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presumption of availability to the EU of •	
NATO's collective capabilities and assets;
identification of European command options •	
which recognise a special role for NATO's 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(DSACEUR).
These arrangements were first implemented 
in spring 2003 for the Operation CONCORDIA 
in FYROM and in the current operation ALTHEA 
in BiH. 
To support close co-operation in crisis man-
agement, an EU cell has been established at 
SHAPE and a NATO liaison team is hosted in 
the premises of the EU Military Staff in Brus-
sels.
Between the two organisations, a regular 
dialogue takes place in non-decision mak-
ing meetings at various levels, in particular 
between the Political and Security Commit-
tee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
and between the two Military Committees. To 
prevent unnecessary duplication and to ensure 
overall coherence, the two organisations 
meet also in the EU-NATO Capability Group to 
exchange information on capability develop-
ment processes.
Apart from NATO, the EU has also developed 
close co-operation in the field of crisis man-
agement with the United Nations (UN) and the 
African Union (AU). As regards the UN, there 
are regular meetings of the EU-UN Steering 
Committee with the participation of the Euro-
pean Commission and the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
The partnership with the AU has three par-
ticular aspects: strengthening the political dia-
logue, making the African peace and security 
architecture fully operational and providing 
predictable funding for the AU's peacekeeping 
operations.
The EU also maintains an important dia-
logue on crisis management with the Organi-
sation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Association of South-East Asia 
Nations (ASEAN).
euroPean SeCuriTy STraTegy
“The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in 
particular Berlin-Plus, enhance the opera-
tional capability of the EU and provide the 
framework for the strategic partnership 
between the two organisations in crisis 
management. This reflects our common 
determination to tackle the challenges of the 
new century.”
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9.2 Training and eduCaTion in 
THe field of CSdP
level, with a particular focus on the 
interface between military and civilian 
areas. Such a holistic and co-ordinated 
training policy would contribute to the 
overall goal of improving civil-military 
as well as civil-civil-co-ordination.”
Based on the Training Policy and Concept, 
an annual training management cycle has been 
established including four phases:
an analysis of training needs and require-1. 
ments in the field of CSDP,
based on this, the design of an EU Train-2. 
ing Programme listing all training activities 
offered at EU level,
the conduct of these training activities by the 3. 
various training actors at EU and at national 
level,
an annual evaluation in the form of a “Com-4. 
prehensive Annual Report on Training Activ-
ities in the field of CSDP / CART”.
eu Training PoliCy and Training 
ConCePT in THe field of CSdP
When CSDP development started under the 
umbrella of the EU, it became obvious that the 
different aspects of crisis management would 
require appropriate training, not only offered 
at national level but complemented by training 
at EU level, the latter focusing in particular on 
the promotion of a European diplomatic cul-
ture and a European security culture.
To this end, in 2003 and 2004, the Council 
adopted an EU Training Policy and an EU Train-
ing Concept in the field of CSDP. The key objec-
tive defined is 
“
the adoption of a holistic and co-ordi-
nated approach on training matters 
which should aim at establishing links 
and strengthening synergies between 
the different training initiatives at EU 
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The outer circle of the overview depicts 
the external dimension. ESDP is an open and 
transparent process. Close cooperation with 
third states and international organisations is 
a basic principle for the EU as regards the con-
duct of crisis management operations.
The EU Training Programme lists training 
activities of the EU actors (ESDC) and of the 
Member States’ national institutes which they 
open to participation by other nationals. It dif-
ferentiates between 
courses of the European Security and •	
Defence College 
other security and defence policy courses, •	
training activities in the field of civilian crisis •	
management,
specific civil-military training activities, also •	
related to inter-pillar co-ordination,
specific police training activities related to •	
crisis management and 
military training activities in the field of •	
CSDP
Following the EU’s comprehensive approach, 
training actors are encouraged to combine civil-
ian and military participation whenever possible. 
THe euroPean SeCuriTy 
and defenCe College
At EU level, the European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC), established in 2005, 
plays a major role in the implementation of the 
yearly training cycle relevant to CSDP. Not only 
does the College contribute significantly to the 
implementation of the training programme 
through the delivery of its courses, its Secre-
tariat contributes to the analysis of the train-
ing requirements, the development of the EU 
training programme relevant to CSDP and the 
evaluation of this training programme through 
the Comprehensive Annual Report on Training 
(CART).
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
Since 2009, the EU Training Programme has 
been run via the internet (“Schoolmaster” 
application). The internet address is: 
https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu
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bers but is supposed to grow to a total of 8 civil-
ian and military staff.
The College established its own training con-
cept addressing all levels of personnel from 
working level up to the level of decision- mak-
ers working in the field of CSDP. In line with 
this concept, and, as shown in the overview, it 
offers a growing number and variety of train-
ing activities including courses for specialised 
staff.
All training courses of the ESDC are sup-
ported by an Internet-based distance learning 
system. 
The main objective of the ESDC is to provide 
Member States and EU Institutions with knowl-
edgeable personnel able to work efficiently on 
CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the 
College makes a major contribution to a better 
understanding of CSDP in the overall context 
of CFSP and to promoting a common European 
security culture. Helping to build professional 
relations and contacts at European level, the Col-
lege activities promote a co-operative spirit and 
co-operative methods at all levels.
The ESDC is a network college. Several 
national universities, academies, colleges and 
institutes contribute to the success of the ESDC. 
The network members are well-known national 
civilian and military educational and research 
institutions in Europe. It also includes the EU 
Institute for Security Studies located in Paris. 
The College also co-operates with other exter-
nal training actors such as the Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy (GCSP).
A three-tier governance structure has been 
established for the college’s functioning com-
prising a Steering Committee, an Executive Aca-
demic Board and a Permanent Secretariat. The 
Secretariat currently has 3 full-time staff mem-
STandard CourSeS
CSDP High Level Course (annual/4 Modules) •	
CSDP Orientation Course (3 to 5 days)•	
CSDP Course for PPI staff (2/3 days)•	
Alumni Seminars (participants of the higher level courses)•	
new TyPeS of Training aCTiviTieS
Security Sector Reform/SSR (two types of courses, 3 days and 10 days)•	
CSDP Mission Planning Procedures Course (3 days)•	
Course on EU Military and Civilian Capability Development (3 days)•	
CMCO – Civil Military Co-ordination in CSDP Missions and Operations (10 days)•	
International Law for EU Military Legal Advisor (annual/3 Modules)•	
Peace Building Course•	
SPeCial aCTiviTieS
CSDP Training Modules in the context of exchange programmes of young military officers•	
Symposium on Effectiveness of CSDP Operations: Gender Issues•	
Annual Networking Conference on Training related to CSDP•	
GS/HR Solana lectures at the European  
Security and Defence College in 2006
eSdC Training aCTiviTieS
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given a crucial role in the implementation of the 
initiative. 
Building on the existing three-tier structure 
and the ESDC network, an Implementation Group 
was created in February 2009 as a task-oriented 
structure of the ESDC’s Executive Academic 
Board, charged with implementing this initiative. 
Since the start of this initiative, progress has 
been reached on various aspects of it, includ-
ing the conduct of common CSDP modules 
(already done in Portugal and Spain) based on 
the standard curriculum developed by ESDC. 
With the cooperation of the Faculty of Law and 
Political Science of the University of Liège, a 
detailed stocktaking has been finalised which 
will allow the interested institutes to easily iden-
tify partners with whom organise exchanges. 
A framework arrangement has been agreed 
which should also facilitate the establishment 
of exchange programmes for the interested 
national institutes. Several other common cur-
ricula have meanwhile been put at the disposal 
of the Member States and these courses will 
start to be held in 2010.
Thanks to the Bulgarian Military University, a 
dedicated forum for the exchange of information 
both between cadets and between the members 
of the Implementation Group has been set up. 
Since its establishment in 2005, the college 
has provided training at strategic level for more 
than 2200 diplomats, civilians and police and 
military personnel from Member States and EU 
Institutions. In addition, since 2006, about 300 
civilian and military staff from third states and 
international organisations have attended CSDP 
courses of the college.
The success of the ESDC courses lies in a 
mixture of making the best use of the academic 
expertise, contacts and experience of our net-
work members and bringing to the courses the 
practical knowledge of the specialists from the 
European Institutions working on a day-to day 
basis on the important dossiers in the field of 
ESDP. Applying the basic principle of mixed 
civilian and military audiences in almost all 
ESDC course, the College makes a significant 
effort in support of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to crisis management. 
THe euroPean iniTiaTive for THe 
eXCHange of miliTary young 
offiCerS inSPired by eraSmuS
A specific task given to the ESDC is to pro-
vide support for exchange programmes of the 
national training institutes. 
More concretely, under the French Presi-
dency in the second half on 2008, the Council 
approved an initiative aimed at increasing the 
number of international exchanges during the 
initial academic and professional training of 
young officers. Subsequently, the ESDC was 
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
You can visit the dedicated forum for the 
Exchange of Military Young Officers on:
http ://www.emilyo.eu
significant contribution to implement the EU’s overall training policy (holistic and co-ordi-•	
nated approach)
network college including military, civilian and diplomatic training actors•	
combined civilian and military participation in ALL ESDC training activities•	
curriculum development – standard curricula of main courses and specialised courses •	
reflect the EU’s comprehensive approach
specialised courses on specific aspects of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis manage-•	
ment
training record: since 2005, about 2500 civilian and military personnel trained of which more •	
than 10 % came from third states and international organisations
eSdC’S ConTribuTion To THe eu’S ComPreHenSive aPProaCH – Summary
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9.3 Human rigHTS and gender 
aSPeCTS
The European Union launched its first crisis 
management operation in 2003. Since then it 
has conducted more than 20 military, police 
and rule of law operations on three continents. 
The experience it has gained from earlier and 
ongoing operations feeds into those currently 
at the planning stages. In this context, the EU 
has learned that including Human Rights and 
Gender approaches in all of its missions makes 
them more effective.
CSDP operations are aimed at conflict man-
agement, preventing crises from unfolding 
and stabilizing post-conflict situations. Human 
rights violations are part and parcel of crises 
and conflicts. The promotion of human rights, 
with special emphasis on gender and rights of 
the child and the rule of law are key to sustain-
able conflict resolution and to lasting peace 
and security.
In line with the European Security Strategy, 
over the last few years, a number of practical 
and concrete steps have been taken in order 
to ensure mainstreaming of human rights into 
ESDP. 
This includes inter alia 
the appointment of a human rights advisor •	
to the Special Advisors, Operation/Force 
Commander or Head of Mission in CSDP-
missions and operations;
the development of standard training guide-•	
lines for CSDP training;
the inclusion of human rights aspects in •	
CSDP exercises and in preparatory activities 
such as fact-finding missions and planning 
teams.
Last but not least, a handbook has been com-
piled and made available. The handbook com-
bines the documents that comprise the guid-
ing principles for planners of EU operations. 
It is intended to serve as a tool for those who 
cooperate with, plan, train, carry out, evaluate 
and report on EU crisis management. Making 
this handbook widely accessible will help us 
to achieve better mutual understanding and 
raise awareness of human rights and gender 
aspects of the ESDP, thus enhancing the syner-
gies of our activities on the ground.
The handbook is a living document, and as 
CSDP evolves, it will be regularly updated.
euroPean SeCuriTy STraTegy
“Spreading good governance, supporting 
social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing 
the rule of law and protecting human rights 
are the best means of strengthening the 
international order.”
SourCeS for more and 
uPdaTed informaTion
The title of the handbook is “Mainstreaming 
Human Rights and Gender into ESDP”. It is 
available on the webpage of the Council: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/hr/news144.pdf
EUFOR RD Congo – First Aid
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nies, guerrilla armies and private militia). It is 
internationally acknowledged that civil society 
organisations, international donors and the 
media have an important role to play in SSR 
processes as well. In addition, a mainstreamed 
gender focus needs to be included to make 
SSR successful.
Several achievements to define common 
goals for security sector reform have already 
been made. The UN Secretary General’s Report 
on SSR (2008) provided an overarching frame-
work for countries and organisations aiming at 
reforms of security systems. At the EU level, 
both the Council of the European Union (2005) 
and the European Commission (2006) have 
developed plans for SSR support.
Pool of euroPean SSr eXPerTS
At the meeting on 17 Nov. 2009 the Council 
of the European Union welcomed the consider-
able progress made in the implementation of 
the agreement of November 2008 to enhance 
the capability of the EU in the area of Secu-
rity Sector Reform (SSR) by creating a pool of 
European SSR experts to be used in the con-
9.4 SeCuriTy SeCTor reform
The reform of the security sector has become 
one of the major topics of international con-
cern in connection with crisis management and 
post-crisis recovery during the last decade. 
The focus on traditional security actors such 
as the police, the military, the judiciary, prison 
personnel, border guards, and intelligence has 
been complemented by a more comprehen-
sive view of human security, bringing the basic 
needs and physical, social and economic secu-
rity and safety of individuals and the popula-
tion to the centre of attention. 
SSr aCTorS
The core security actors, together with all 
security management and oversight bodies, 
the justice and law enforcement institutions 
as well as non-statutory security forces need 
to act on the principles of human rights, local 
ownership, accountability and sustainability 
in co-operation and co-ordination with other 
national and international state and non-state 
actors for creating/developing a stable envi-
ronment.
The OECD DAC Reference Document Secu-
rity System Reform and Governance agreed by 
ministers in 2004 defined the security system 
as including: core security actors (e.g. armed 
forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, 
customs and immigration, and intelligence and 
security services); security management and 
oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence 
and internal affairs, financial management 
bodies and public complaint commissions); 
justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. 
the judiciary, prisons, prosecution service, tra-
ditional justice systems); and non-statutory 
security forces (e.g. private security compa-
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Amura military  
fort visit, 19 June 2009
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text of SSR activities carried out by the EU, 
within the framework of ESDP or Community 
external action. 
The modalities for the setting up of the pool, 
for the deployment of experts and for training 
and related activities have been completed, 
enabling the creation of a community of 
experts familiar with SSR questions as a whole 
and sharing a common approach to SSR. The 
revised CRT concept takes into account the 
establishment of the pool. 
In this context, the Council noted work on 1. 
developing a Guiding Framework for EU SSR 
Assessments aimed at providing a practi-
cal tool for the EU Institutions for assessing 
and planning possible EU SSR actions both 
within the framework of ESDP and in Com-
munity external actions, also with a view to 
strengthening the EU's capacity to imple-
ment such actions. 
The Council encouraged the continuation of 2. 
efforts to strengthen the EU’s SSR capacity, 
including through cooperation with other 
actors, especially the UN, and underlined the 
importance that the expert pool becomes 
operational as soon as possible.
imPlemenTaTion of SSr
The current implementation of SSR is fac-
ing several challenges: SSR calls into question 
per se existing power structures. Regions and 
nation states with a very dominant security sec-
tor react critically to externally proposed reform 
strategies. Donor countries need to bridge the 
gap between their own SSR policies and the 
imperative of local ownership without which 
reforms cannot become sustainable. Security 
sector reform faces a divergence between its 
holistic approach and various institutional prac-
tices so far. International organisations also 
have different approaches to SSR.
The need to further develop a comprehen-
sive approach and training strategies is more 
than evident. Successful SSR missions require 
well -educated and -trained experts, at the 
strategic political and administrative level as 
well as in the field. 
Governments need to streamline their action 
on security sector reforms both at home and 
through their development assistance. Unfor-
tunately, too little preparation for experts 
on SSR is offered. Most of the existing study 
and training programmes still focus on exclu-
sive approaches of individual security actors 
rather than a concerted whole-of-government 
approach.
SSr Training
Training for SSR programmes is only at the 
initial stage . The UN DPKO SSR Team devel-
ops training modules, but needs assistance 
to serve the needs for capacity building in the 
international community. 
The International Security Sector Advisory 
Team (ISSAT) at DCAF has developed a train-
ing approach that is implemented on an ad 
hoc basis tailored to the needs of the recipi-
ent group or country. ISSAT has initiated the 
foundation of the Association for Security Sec-
tor Education and Training (ASSET) compris-
ing training institutes which have started SSR 
training, partly in collaboration with the Euro-
pean Security and Defence College (ESDC).
Most recently, under the ESDC, curricula for 
two courses on SSR have been developed and 
will be completed through the ESDC relying on 
qualified national training institutes of the EU 
Member States. 
The curricula are designed for a basic SSR 
course (3 days) and a core SSR course (7 days), 
in particular to support the creation of an EU 
pool of experts for SSR missions.
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10.1 CommuniCaTing eu Common 
SeCuriTy and defenCe PoliCy – 
an overview
informaTion on CSdP oPeraTionS …
Operations are the most visible output of 
the European Union Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). With 23 operations 
(and a 24th in preparation for Somalia at the 
time of writing) launched since 2003, on four 
continents, some of them complex missions in 
challenging, high-profile environments, CSDP 
has gained increasing recognition as a tangible 
dimension of the EU's foreign policy. For each 
CSDP operation or mission, key aims include 
on the one hand ensuring the coherence of the 
message among the different EU stakeholders 
(definition of an information strategy, prepa-
ration of master messages), and on the other 
hand communicating towards the press and 
the public on the operation:
Such activities include:
press information, technical briefings and •	
press conferences involving the main players 
– political, military or civilian – in an opera-
tion, on the occasion of the main events (e.g. 
decision, launch, termination); press trips;
press releases and High Representative •	
statements on the occasion of these or other 
events;
production and circulation of print, Internet •	
and audiovisual material on each operation 
(see below).
… and on CSdP STruCTureS 
and CaPabiliTieS
The CSDP press team in the Council Sec-
retariat, in contact with other partners, also 
actively communicates on developments 
regarding the CSDP's civilian and military 
structures and the capability process. It does 
so notably in relation with events such as 
meetings of EU defence ministers (informal or 
in the framework of the Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil) or the launch of a given project: EU Battle-
groups (on which it seeks to coordinate with 
Member States e.g. regarding media coverage 
of BG exercises); Operations Centre (cf. press 
visit on the activation of the OpsCentre during 
the exercise MILEX 07). Steering Board meet-
ings and other events in the European Defence 
Agency are opportunities to conduct informa-
tion activities on the EDA's work.
a wide range of ProduCTS 
and reSourCeS
Over the last years, the CSDP press team 
has developed a range of information and 
communication products on CSDP. It does so 
in cooperation with other stakeholders such 
as the European Security and Defence College 
(ESDC), the EU Institute for Security Studies 
and the European Defence Agency, as well as 
with the European Commission regarding the 
EU's external action as a whole.
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PrinT maTerial
Institutional print material on CSDP includes 
the following items:
ESDP newsletter (six-monthly, circulation •	
around 20,000 copies): 9 issues published 
since December 2005. The newsletter aims 
to present CSDP operations and other activi-
ties in a clear, illustrative way for both a spe-
cialised readership and the wider public;
a range of booklets (cf. “the EU, an exporter •	
of peace and security” since 2003, the Euro-
pean Security Strategy booklet, as well as 
thematic/regional strategies cf. EU-Africa;
a range of fact sheets and background docu-•	
ments produced for each CSDP operation 
and on specific topics (e.g. the EU Engage-
ment in Afghanistan or in Somalia, the EU 
Battlegroups, military capabilities);
the EU Military Staff's bulletin, Impetus, •	
aimed primarily at a military readership;
in cooperation with the European Commis-•	
sion, material on “EU in the world – working 
for peace, security and stability”;
material produced by the EU Institute for •	
Security Studies (EU-ISS Newsletter, quar-
terly, Chaillot Papers, Occasional Papers, 
books (e.g. “What ambitions for European 
defence in 2020?”);
material produced by the European Defence •	
Agency (e.g. EDA bulletin, quarterly and spe-
cific leaflets).
inTerneT
The Council of the EU's web site hosts the 
CSDP homepage: www.consilium.europa.eu/
csdp, which contains information on:
all CSDP operations and missions (including •	
links towards specific operation websites 
where applicable);
CSDP news;•	
structures, notably the EU Military Staff, the •	
EU Military Committee, the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
capabilities;•	
the European Security Strategy.•	
EULEX Kosovo: Communicating CSDP – The Head of the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, 
Yves de Kermabon, during his visit to Kosovo on 14 and 15 March 2008 
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Other institutional Internet resources 
include:
(EU Institute for Security Studies)•	
www.eda.europa.eu  •	
(European Defence Agency)
www.eusc.europa.eu  •	
(EU Satellite Centre)
www.eeas.europa.eu  •	
(External action website)
audioviSual maTerial
The development of an audiovisual offer on 
CSDP has been a priority in recent years. A 
range of resources are now available.
Video material (VNRs – Video News Releases •	
– and stock shots) is produced and made 
available for televisions on specific occa-
sions such as the launch of an operation; 
such material can be found and downloaded 
in broadcast quality on www.tvnewsroom.
consilium.europa.eu
a YouTube CSDP page is available: www.•	
youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence
some of the audiovisual material is released •	
in the form of DVDs for distribution to the 
wider public (since 2003);
cooperation with productions by TV chan-•	
nels on CSDP;
a CSDP photo library is being developed. A •	
selection is available online on the Council 
website. 
Arrangements are being developed with •	
individual Member States concerning the 
sharing of audiovisual resources notably in 
the context of operations.
PreSS TriPS
Press visits to the theatre of CSDP opera-
tions and missions have been organised since 
2004 for European journalists. Visits to Bal-
kans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh 
(Indonesia), Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) or on 
EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, have notably been organ-
ised under the “Prince” programme in order to 
highlight the EU's comprehensive activities on 
the ground (CSDP operation and EU Delega-
tion). Other visits are organised on the basis of 
the resources of the operations themselves.
looking for SynergieS 
and ouTreaCH: TowardS a 
“CSdP PubliC diPlomaCy”
The Council Secretariat has been trying to 
develop synergies with and among Member 
States, including through mutual information 
concerning products and initiatives.
Meetings of officials in charge of informa-•	
tion and communication on CSDP have been 
organised since 2001 in the framework of 
the Council's Working Party on Information. 
These meetings provide opportunities to 
exchange information, material and experi-
ence; 
an extranet network – “Infonet CSDP” – is •	
available to share information on CSDP 
related communication activities among EU 
Member States and institutions;
regular information on communication •	
activities is given to Council bodies, includ-
ing the Political Security Committee and the 
Military Committee.
Increasingly, outreach and awareness-rais-
ing activities have been developed by the Sec-
retariat and other stakeholders.
The European Security and Defence Col-•	
lege contributes to raising the awareness 
of CSDP in Member States but also beyond. 
An annual CSDP Press and Public Informa-
tion Course has been established in 2006 in 
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the framework of the ESDC. The course aims 
to provide press and information personnel 
from EU Member States, EU institutions and 
CSDP missions and operations with up-to-
date knowledge of CSDP and to facilitate the 
sharing of experience;
the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris •	
is also a key player in outreach activities on 
CSDP. As a European body where leaders, 
the media, academics, industrialists and 
elected representatives rub shoulders on a 
day-to-day basis, it contributes to spread-
ing the ideas and values on which the EU’s 
foreign and security policy is founded. 
Information and communication activities 
are part of its work together with academic 
research and policy analysis and the organi-
sation of seminars (including the Institute’s 
Annual Conference, at which the High Rep-
resentative delivers an address on the state 
of the Common foreign and security policy). 
The Institute's work involves a network of 
exchanges with other research institutes 
and think-tanks both inside and outside the 
European Union. The Institute's output is 
distributed widely;
the Council Secretariat and the Commission •	
regularly co-organise seminars for journal-
ists, think-tanks and NGOs on the topic “the 
EU in the world”, including CSDP;
These activities are likely to be continued 
under the new Lisbon Treaty notably by the 
European External action service (due to be 
created in the course of 2010) with other part-
ners.
Contact: presse.pesd@consilium.europa.eu
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Communication of EUFOR to the local population, 4 December 2008
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anneX 1
CourSe on Common SeCuriTy  
and defenCe PoliCy (CSdP)
illuSTraTive CourSe Programme
main THeme:   THe euroPean union/inSTiTuTional framework
Session 1 eu institutional framework and Treaties / role of the Council, european Parlia-
ment and the european Commission 
The European Union has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
including the strengthening of the security of the European Union in all ways, pre-
serving peace, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
Through the CFSP, the EU expresses its positions on the international scene and acts 
consistently where the Member States share common interests. Within the context 
of the CFSP, the Union is developing a common security and defence policy (CSDP), 
covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a 
common defence, should the Council so decide. 
The Council of the EU plays a vital role in implementing this policy and the European 
Commission is fully associated with it. The role of the European Parliament in rela-
tion to CFSP/CSDP is to be further elaborated. 
This session will provide an overview of the EU's institutional setting. Speakers will 
in particular focus on the role of the relevant EU Institution in the field of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Pol-
icy (CSDP).
Session 2 “a Secure europe in a better world” – The european Security Strategy (eSS) 
“Our ambition is a Europe more active and more capable; an articulate and persua-
sive champion of effective multilateralism; a regional actor and a global ally. The 
preparation of the European Security Strategy has helped us to discover a remark-
able convergence of views on security issues between EU Member States and to 
uncover an authentic and uniquely European voice on security issues. The challenge 
ahead is to persuade and implement.” (Javier Solana former HR for the CFSP)
This session will provide an insight into the European Security Strategy, the risk 
assessment, the main strategic objectives identified in the strategy and the policy 
implications for Europe. It should also give an update on the state of affairs as 
regards the implementation of the ESS.
Session 3 CSdP development: overview 
This session will provide an overview of CSDP, its historical background, main politi-
cal decisions leading to the development of CFSP/CSDP within the European Union. 
It will also discuss the areas in which progress has been made since the Cologne 
European Council in June 1999.
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main THeme:  CSdP organiSaTional aSPeCTS
Session 1 Civilian and military Structures
At the Cologne meeting in June 1999, the European Council decided that “the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible mili-
tary forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. It was on that 
basis that continued efforts led to the establishment of permanent political, civilian 
and military structures with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) playing a 
central role in the field of CFSP/CSDP. 
This session will provide a comprehensive overview of the existing civilian and mili-
tary structures, their functioning and inter-relationship. 
Session 2 eu's Crisis management Procedures and decision making Process
The European Union developed a set of crisis management procedures to enable 
the Union to take decisions on operational engagement in international crisis man-
agement. 
This session will introduce the key steps of EU decision making. It will also examine 
“theory versus practice”, how decision making is done in practice in past and cur-
rent missions/operations. 
main THeme:  To be more CaPable  (eSS)
Session 1 development of Civilian Capabilities
ESS: “In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by 
civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to 
bear in crisis and post crisis situations.” 
This session will provide an overview of the development of European civilian capa-
bilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.
Session 2 development of military Capabilities
ESS: “A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to real-
ise our full potential. Actions under way – notably the establishment of a defence 
agency – take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible, 
mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for 
defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.” 
This session will inform on the state of affairs as regards the development of the 
military capabilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010. 
Session 3 european defence agency (eda)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by a Joint Action of the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 12 July, 2004 “to support the Member States in their effort to 
improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sus-
tain the CSDP as it stands now and develops in the future”. This session will provide 
an overview of the EDA's main functions, its organisation and current work. 
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main THeme:  working wiTH ParTnerS  (eSS)
Session 1 eu – naTo relations
ESS: “The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin-Plus, enhance the 
operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partner-
ship between the two organisations in crisis management.” 
This session will consider the current state of affairs on co-operation between EU 
and NATO in crisis management.
Session 2  eu – un relations 
ESS: “The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations 
Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, 
equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European prior-
ity.” 
This session will provide a brief overview of EU-UN co-operation in the field of 
CSDP. 
Session 3 eu – au relations
ESS: “Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European 
Union … regional organisations such as … the African Union make an important 
contribution to a more orderly world.” Over the past years, the EU developed suc-
cessfully co-operation with the African Union in many field of CSDP. 
This session will provide a brief overview of past and current efforts to co-operate.
Session 4 Co-operation with Third States in the field of CSdP 
ESS: “There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats … are 
common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a 
necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation 
in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.” 
This session will consider EU co-operation with third states like Canada, Ukraine, 
Russia in the field of CSDP. 
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main THeme:  To be more aCTive  (eSS)  
Session 1 eu Crisis management – Past, Current and Potential future operations and  
missions overview
ESS: “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention. As a Union of 27 members, spending more than 160 
billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultane-
ously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both mili-
tary and civilian capabilities.” This session will provide an overview of EU's opera-
tional engagement in Civilian and Military Crisis Management. 
Session 2 Human rights and gender aspects 
ESS: “Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, deal-
ing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting 
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” 
This session will examine human rights and gender aspects and their impact on sus-
tainable conflict resolution. It will inform on EU policies, concepts and action taken 
to implement respective UNSC Resolutions in the context of CSDP in general and in 
EU missions and operations in particular.
main THeme:   To be more CoHerenT (eSS)
Session Civil-military Co-ordination (CmCo)
The EU is in an unique situation to have at its disposal all instruments (political, 
diplomatic, economic, financial, civil and military) necessary for international crisis 
management. The challenge is now to bring together the different instruments and 
capabilities. Effective co-ordination of all the instruments is necessary for the EU to 
achieve maximum impact and exert maximum political leverage through its crisis 
management operations. 
This session will inform on the principles of civil-military co-ordination (CMCO) 
and practical measures taken so far in the field of CSDP to improve co-ordination 
between all relevant instruments and actors.
main THeme:  CSdP fuTure PerSPeCTiveS 
Session CSdP development – Challenges and Prospects 
This session will examine the future perspectives of the CSDP. The speaker will 
consider essential factors which likely will impact the further development and will 
draw from this conclusions how CSDP might further evolve.
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













Introduction 
 
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.  The violence of the first half of the 
20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. 
 
The creation of the European Union has been central to this development.  It has transformed the 
relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens.  European countries are committed to 
dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions.  Over this 
period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes 
change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies.  Successive enlargements are making a reality 
of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.  
 
The United States has played a critical role in European 
integration and European security, in particular through NATO.  
The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant 
position as a military actor.  However, no single country is able 
to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. 
 
Europe still faces security threats and challenges.  The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a 
reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent.  Over the last decade, no region of the 
world has been untouched by armed conflict.  Most of these conflicts have been within rather than 
between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.  
 
As a union of 25 states with over 450 million 
people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross 
National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of 
instruments at its disposal, the European Union is 
inevitably a global player.  In the last decade 
European forces have been deployed abroad to 
places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC.  The increasing convergence of 
European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible 
and effective actor.  Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world. 
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





 
I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS 
 
Global Challenges 
 
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and 
external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development 
of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people.  
Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice.  These developments 
have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs.  And they 
have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in 
transport, energy, information and other fields.  
 
Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians.  Over 18 million 
people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict. 
 
In much of the developing world, poverty and 
disease cause untold suffering and give rise to 
pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion 
people, half the world’s population, live on 
less than 2 Euros a day.  45 million die every 
year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now 
one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of 
societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer 
now than it was 10 years ago.  In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and 
violent conflict. 
 
Security is a precondition of development.  Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including 
social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic 
activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity 
and poverty. 
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










Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming 
over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various 
regions.  
 
Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe.  Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil 
and gas.  Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today.  This will rise to 70% in 
2030.  Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. 
 
Key Threats 
Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable.  Instead, Europe faces new 
threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.   
 
Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness 
and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe.  
Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are 
willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. 
 
The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism.  
It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and 
political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.  This phenomenon is 
also a part of our own society. 
 
Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been 
attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain 
and Belgium.  Concerted European action is indispensable. 
 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is 
potentially the greatest threat to our security.  The 
international treaty regimes and export control arrangements 
have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems.  We 
are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that 
raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the 
Middle East.  Advances in the biological sciences may 
increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming 
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years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility.  The spread of 
missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk. 
 
The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for 
States and armies.  
 
Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean 
Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, 
above all in the Middle East.  Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten 
regional stability.   They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten 
minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.  Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and 
state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand 
for WMD.  The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal 
with the older problems of regional conflict. 
 
State Failure:  Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of 
accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about 
the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best 
known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as 
organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global 
governance, and adds to regional instability. 
 
Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security 
has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and 
weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with 
terrorism.   
 
Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have 
fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade 
in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world.  All these activities 
undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come 
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to dominate the state.  90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – 
where the drugs trade pays for private armies.  Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal 
networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex 
trade world wide.  A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the 
growth in maritime piracy. 
 
Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the 
availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and 
the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.  
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









II. STRATEGIC  OBJECTIVES 
 
We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The 
future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To 
defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:  
 
Addressing the Threats 
The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats. 
 
 It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European 
Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance 
with the U.S.A.  The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its 
defences. 
 
 It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years.  The Union has just agreed a 
further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit 
procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty 
regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions. 
 
 The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts 
and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in  the 
DRC.  Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the 
authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with 
organised crime within the EU. 
 
In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be 
as much a concern as those that are near at hand.  
Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks 
in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle 
East are all of concern to Europe. 
 
Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate 
world-wide: their activities in central or south-
east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens.  Meanwhile, global 
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






communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies 
anywhere in the world. 
 
Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the 
threat of invasion.  With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new 
threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will 
become ever more dangerous.  State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as 
we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.  
Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. 
 
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; 
nor can any be tackled by purely military means.  Each requires a mixture of instruments.  
Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic 
and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled.  Dealing with terrorism 
may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means.  In failed states, 
military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate 
crisis.  Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be 
needed in the post conflict phase.  Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis 
management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to 
respond to such multi-faceted situations.  
 
Building Security in our Neighbourhood 
 
Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important.  It is in the European interest that 
countries on our borders are well-governed.  Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak 
states where organised crime flourishes, 
dysfunctional societies or exploding population 
growth on its borders all pose problems for 
Europe. 
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The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings  the EU closer to troubled 
areas.  Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union 
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. 
 
The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, 
Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by 
the outbreak of major conflict.  The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of 
our achievements there.  The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive 
for reform. 
 
It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe.  We need to 
extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while 
tackling political problems there.  We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region. 
 
Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.  Without this, there will be 
little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East.  The European Union must remain 
engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution -
which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted.  Implementing it will require a united 
and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, 
and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. 
 
The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, 
social unrest and unresolved conflicts.   The European Union's interests require a continued 
engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural 
cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.  A broader engagement with the Arab 
World should also be considered. 
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








AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM 
 
In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity 
increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger 
international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order 
is our objective. 
 
We are committed to upholding and developing International Law.  The fundamental framework for 
international relations is the United Nations 
Charter. The United Nations Security Council 
has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it 
to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively,  
is a European priority. 
 
We want international organisations, regimes  
and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and  must 
therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. 
 
Key institutions in the international system,  such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership.  China has joined the WTO 
and Russia is negotiating its entry.  It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of 
such bodies while maintaining their high standards.  
 
One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship.  This is not 
only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole.  NATO is an 
important expression of this relationship. 
 
Regional organisations also strengthen global governance.  For the European Union, the strength 
and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance.  Other 
regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important 
contribution to a more orderly world.  
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It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments 
such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing 
existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the 
International Criminal Court.  Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be 
increased through confidence building and arms control regimes.  Such instruments can also make 
an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. 
 
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its 
foundation.  The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.  
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of 
strengthening the international order. 
 
Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest 
provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member 
States are well placed to pursue these goals. 
  
Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade 
measures  remains an important  feature in our policy that we should further reinforce.  A world 
seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union 
and its citizens.  
 
A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society.  Some 
have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms.  It is desirable that such 
countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide 
assistance.  Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, 
including in their relationship with the European Union. 
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


III.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 
 
The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis 
management.  We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated 
in the Balkans and beyond.  But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we 
need to be more active, more coherent and more capable.  And we need to work with others. 
 
 
More active in pursuing our strategic objectives.  This 
applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis 
management and conflict prevention at our disposal, 
including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade 
and development activities.  Active policies are needed to 
counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention. 
 
As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to 
sustain several operations simultaneously.  We could add particular value by developing operations 
involving both military and civilian capabilities. 
 
The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and 
security.  The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries 
emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management 
situations. 
 
We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are 
detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise.  Preventive engagement can avoid more 
serious problems in the future.  A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is 
more active will be one which carries greater political weight. 
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More Capable.  A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our 
full potential.  Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the 
right direction.   
 
To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new 
threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. 
 
Systematic use of pooled and shared assets   would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the 
medium-term, increase capabilities. 
 
In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos.  We 
need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis 
situations.  
 
Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States 
with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign 
requires better understanding and communication. 
 
Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing 
of intelligence among Member States and with partners. 
 
As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of 
missions.  This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in 
combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader 
institution building. 
 
The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational 
capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two 
organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the 
challenges of the new century. 
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





 
More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and 
Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a 
number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. 
 
The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European 
assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from 
Member States and other instruments.  All of these can have an impact on our security and on that 
of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. 
 
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. 
In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. 
 
Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the 
fight both against terrorism and organised crime. 
 
Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external 
activities of the individual member states.  
 
Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict.  Problems are 
rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience 
in both the Balkans and West Africa shows. 
 
Working with partners  There are few if any problems we can 
deal with on our own.  The threats described above are common 
threats, shared with all our closest partners. International 
cooperation is a necessity.  We need to pursue our objectives 
both through multilateral cooperation in international 
organisations and through partnerships with key actors. 
 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.  Acting together, 
the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.  Our aim 
should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.  This is an additional reason for the 
EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence. 
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We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and 
prosperity.  Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership. 
 
Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world:  our neighbours 
in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and  in  Asia.  These relationships are 
an important asset to build on.  In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with 
Japan, China, Canada and India  as well as  with all those who share our goals and values, and are 
prepared to act in their support. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential 
to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the 
opportunities.  An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale.  In 
doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more 
united world. 
 
 
 
 
 

anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  119 











































anneX 3
120  HANDBOOK CSDP 













































anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  121 















































anneX 3
122  HANDBOOK CSDP 













































anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  123 















































anneX 3
124  HANDBOOK CSDP 












































anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  125 






































anneX 3
126  HANDBOOK CSDP 










































anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  127 

















































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






























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


























anneX 3
HANDBOOK CSDP  131 
anneX 4
(c) the financial control procedures.
When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to
the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The
High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.
SECTION 2
PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
Article 42
(ex Article 17 TEU)
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention
and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member
States.
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting
unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a
decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain
Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security
and defence policy established within that framework.
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by
the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them
available to the common security and defence policy.
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to
satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any
measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
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4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from
a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union
instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of
Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a
task shall be governed by Article 44.
6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions
shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall
be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.
Article 43
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and
military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating
terrorism in their territories.
2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their
objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close
and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the
civilian and military aspects of such tasks.
Article 44
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may
entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the
necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management
of the task.
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2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress
on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council
immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the
objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In
such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.
Article 45
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the
Council, shall have as its task to:
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating
observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;
(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement
methods;
(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure
coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific
cooperation programmes;
(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the
study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;
(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the
industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of
military expenditure.
2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and
operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the
Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States
engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where
necessary.
Article 46
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation
referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military
capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to
the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall
adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of
participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the
High Representative.
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3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.
The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which
fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the
High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall
take part in the vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.
4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the
commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the
Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.
The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the
participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the
vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.
5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in
question has ceased to participate.
6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent
structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by
unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the
representatives of the participating Member States only.
TITLE VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 47
The Union shall have legal personality.
Article 48
(ex Article 48 TEU)
1. The Treaties may be amended in accordance with an ordinary revision procedure. They may
also be amended in accordance with simplified revision procedures.
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





 

  












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



             



 







    
          
             
          







           
               
   





                 




              

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









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


            


            




              
            
               


 
        





 




             



          



         





             
          




           



                
138  HANDBOOK CSDP 
anneX 5


 


                










SCHUTZ
& HILFE
www.bmlvs.gv.at
ISBN:  978-3-902275-31-8
